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L Introduction
Water has been the lifeblood of Pennsylvania commerce and society.
The development of Pennsylvania's cities, agriculture, transportation and
industry was founded on the Commonwealth's relatively abundant water
resources. From the early days of the colonists to the present, water has
been used, diverted, and consumed for a broad variety of purposes.
Domestic uses, navigation, and mills were once the prime applications of
this state's ground and surface waters, but new demands and needs have
arisen. Mining, steel production, irrigation, power plant cooling, coal
gasification, and a host of other economic uses have created new chal-
lenges, and sometimes conflicts, in the management of water resources.
Nearly seventy percent of Pennsylvania's water resources are ground
waters, waters held in subsurface aquifers and underground streams.'
Indeed, ground water supports the vast majority of the Commonwealth's
surface streams by supplying vital flows from springs and percolations
during seasons of low rainfall.' It is estimated that direct ground-water
withdrawals currently supply eleven percent of Pennsylvania's water
needs. I The use of ground water is increasing dramatically; at least 15,000
to 20,000 new wells are drilled annually in the Commonwealth. 4 Large
segments of the state's population, particularly in rural and suburban areas,
rely on ground water from springs and wells for all or part of their domestic
and agricultural supply.
This article examines the laws and institutions that govern the
allocation and use of ground water in Pennsylvania. A series of interrelated
topics will be explored: (1) the ownership of and rights to use ground
water; (2) the rules that govern interferences with subterranean waters; (3)
the extent to which ground water may be used for various purposes; and (4)
the institutions that regulate ground-water use. The fundamental question
to be asked is how effectively current Pennsylvania ground-water laws and
institutions will serve the long-term interests of the Commonwealth and its
citizens-to what extent do those laws and institutions reflect scientific,
legal or economic theories or public policies that are no longer valid or
accepted, and what adjustments or reforms are necessary to meet new
requirements and problems.
1. A. BECHER, GROUND WATER IN PENNSYLVANIA 14 (Pa. Geol. Survey, Educ. Ser.
No. 3, 1973).
2. J. BIESECKER, J. LESCINSKY & C. WOOD, WATER RESOURCES OFTHE SCHUYLKILL
RIVER BASIN 29 (Pa. Dept. of Forests and Waters Water Resources Bull. No. 3, 1968); H.
MEISLER & A. BECHER, HYDROLOGY OF THE CARBONATE ROCKS OF THE LANCASTER 15-
MINUTE QUADRANGLE, SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 55 (D.E.R. Ground Water Report
W26, 1971); F. OLMSTED & A. HELY, RELATION BETWEEN GROUND WATER AND SURFACE
WATER IN BRANDYWINE CREEK BASIN PENNSYLVANIA A-8 (U.S. Geol. Survey Prof. Paper
417-A, 1962); C. WOOD, H. FLIPPO, J. LESCINSKY & J. BARKER, WATER RESOURCES OF LEHIGH
COUNTY 42 (D.E.R. Water Resource Report 31, 1972).
3. A. BECHER, supra note 1, at 16.
4. Interview with Arthur A. Socolow, State Geologist and Director, Bur. of Topog. &
Geol. Survey, Pa. Dept. of Environ. Res., May 26, 1976. In 1974 20,270 well completion
reports were received by the Bureau of Topographic & Geologic Survey. In 1975, however,
only 12,994 reports were received.
II. Theories of Ground-Water Use and Allocation
In an effort to establish workable rules of liability for interference with
ground water, the courts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
drew distinctions between waters flowing in known subterranean channels
and those that seeped or percolated through underlying rock strata.' This
dichotomy was made necessary by the lack of scientific tools for determin-
ing the source and flow of percolating waters. 6 It was argued that to impose
liability for interference with percolating waters, whose source and flow
were not understood, would severely discourage the development of land.I
Landowners had no way to anticipate the effect of interfering with
percolating waters, but where there was a known, well-defined subter-
ranean stream it was possible to anticipate the impact.
Quite expectedly, the common-law rules that were developed to
govern underground streams were the same as those already applied to
surface streams.8 The owner of land through which an underground stream
flows is entitled to reasonable use of the water giving due regard to the
rights and needs of other users of the stream.' For this "riparian" rule to be
applied, however, the common law required that the underground stream
be known and well-defined. 0 Consequently, a fundamental problem in
ground-water law is what amount of evidence is necessary to prove the
existence of an underground stream. 11 Unless it can be proven that there is
an underground stream, all ground waters are considered to be percolating
waters.' 2 A landowner has the right to make use of the percolating water
beneath his land, but the extent of this right depends upon the legal theory
adopted by the state in which the land is located.
13
An outline of the general approaches to percolating water rights in the
United States is useful in evaluating the law of percolating waters in
Pennsylvania. At least six doctrines have been developed by American
courts and commentators: 14 (1) the absolute privilege or "English" rule;
5. Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863);
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
6. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.
1843).
7. Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514, 519-20 (1863); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528,
532 (1855); Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1234 (Ex. 1843).
8. Heltman's Appeal, 4 Walk. 35 (Pa. 1882); Whetstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. 59 (1857).
9. See generally I WATERS & WATER RIGMTS §§ 4.3, 51.3 (R.E. Clark ed. 1967); Hanks,
The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 630-32 (1968); Weston & Gray,
Legal Control of Consumptive Water Use in Pennsylvania PowerPlants, 80 DICK. L. REV. 353,
363-75 (1976).
10. Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514,520(1863); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528,531
(1855).
II. Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18A. 1012 (1890); Lybe's Appeal,
106 Pa. 626 (1884).
12. Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18A. 1012 (1890);Lybe'sAppeal,
106 Pa. 626 (1884).
13. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 52
(1973).
14. See Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339
(1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); RESTATEMENTOF
(2) the reasonable use or "American" rule; (3) the correlative rights rule;
(4) the First Restatement of Torts rule; (5) the modified American or
Second Restatement rule; and (6) the doctrine of prior aporopriation.
The right to use percolating ground water is broadest in jurisdictions
that follow the common-law or "English" rule.' 5 Under this rule a
landowner may withdraw as much water as he wants from the wells on his
land even though he drains ground water from beneath neighboring lands
and thereby affects the wells of others. ' 6 Under the broadest reading of the
English rule, a landowner is not liable for interference with percolating
water even if he has acted negligently or maliciously. 7
In some states, including Pennsylvania, the English rule gave way to
the American rule of reasonable use: 1 8 a landowner has a right "to such an
amount of water as may be necessary for some useful or beneficial purpose
in connection with the land from which it is taken .... " 9 Moreover,
percolating water may also be diverted for use on other land, absent proof
of injury to persons having a right to use the same underground water
source.20 In contrast to the English rule, the American rule does not give
TORTS §§ 858-63 (1939); NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 13, at 52-55; Hanks & Hanks,
The Law of Water in New Jersey: Ground Water, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 621 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline
Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971); I WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, §§ 17.1, 52.2(B)2;
NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 13, at 52; Hanks v. Hanks, supra note 14, at 631-33.
The rule is the common law only in the sense that later English and American law is derived
from it. The rule does remain law in a few American jurisdictions, but it has been rejected in
England.
16. Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 298-99, 217 N.W.2d
339, 348 (1974).
This rule has been criticized:
It is arguable, therefore, that the English rule was, in its time and place, an
appropriate, or at least not inappropriate, response to certain conflict situations. The
same, though, is not true of some of its 'refinements.' One is the rule that the owner
may pump to the detriment of his neighbors even though he is wasting water by
letting it evaporate or otherwise escape.
Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 632-33.
Most of the early American cases involved disputes between overlying land uses rather
than disputes between competing water uses. The typical case involved an interference with
water use created by some activity on adjacent land. The rule was later extended to cover
competing water use as though it were just another interference. This extension of the rule
went beyond the policy of favoring certain land uses upon which the original decisions were
based. Id., citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798
(1955).
17. [The] 'high point of the English rule' held it permissible for a farmer-
maliciously and for the express purpose of harming his neighbors-to allow his
artesian well to flow and the water to soak into the ground without using it.
Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 633, citing Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354
(1903).
18. See, e.g., Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522,58 N.E. 644(1900); Rothrauff
v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 41 A.2d 87 (1940); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528
(1855).
19. Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278,299,217 N.W.2d 339,
349(1973); accord, Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522,58 N.E. 644(1900); Rothrauff
v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); Williams v. Ladew, 61 Pa. 283
(1894); Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
20. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522,58 N.E. 644(1900); seenotes 107-15 and
accompanying text infra.
the landowner an absolute right to the water beneath his land; he may
neither waste water nor divert it to a use not connected with the land from
which it has been withdrawn if the diversion injures others. 21
Slightly more sophisticated than either the English or American rules,
the correlative rights doctrine22 provides that
the rights of all landowners over a common basin, saturated
strata, or underground reservoir are co-equal or correlative, and
one cannot extract more than his share of the water, even for use
on his own land, where others' rights are injured thereby.23
The correlative rights doctrine demands apportionment of water whenever
the supply is insufficient to satisfy all reasonable uses. 24 The American rule
requires no such apportionment; any landowner may use all the water he
can withdraw so long as he uses it upon his land and does not waste it.
A fundamentally different approach to water allocation was proposed
by the First Restatement of Torts in 1939,25 only to meet with utter
failure. 26 In a radical departure from the property-oriented concepts of the
English, American and correlative rights doctrines, the Restatement pro-
posed that a landowner might be deprived of his ground water if an
adjoining owner's use of that water was more beneficial. This rule proved
unpalatable to courts that had derived their law of ground-water use from
the concept of absolute ownership inherent in the English rule. The
concepts of the First Restatement rule were described by the commentators
for the Second Restatement of Torts:
[The First Restatement] rules were never applied in any Ameri-
can jurisdiction. They call for apportionment of water, and seem
to be a mixture of the American reasonable use rule and the
correlative rights rule at first blush. But unlike the American
rule, the rule of the Restatement [First] does not have the idea
that any beneficial use of the overlying land is reasonable, and it
would allocate water on the basis of balancing utility against
harm, rather than on the equality of right that underlies the
correlative rights doctrine.
27
The proposals of the Second Restatement of Torts have already met
with more success than the original Restatement.28 The proposals preserve
21. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 636.
22. Id. at 637-39; NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 13, at 53-54; I WATERS &
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 52.2(B)4. The doctrine is derived from the California case of
Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903), in which Justice Shaw stated:
Disputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for use on the land, to
which they have an equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to
be settled by giving each a fair and just proportion.
Id. at 136; 74 P. at 772.
23. Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 299,217 N.W.2d 339,
349 (1974).
24. Id. at 300, 217 N.W.2d at 349; Hanks & Hanks, supra note 14, at 638.
25. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 858-63 (1939).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note § 858A at 162 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971).
27. Id.
28. The Second Restatement's proposals were adopted as the law of Wisconsin in
Wisconsin v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
the landowner's right to make beneficial use of ground water on his land
without liability for unforeseen interferences with other water users.
29
Moreover the apportionment problems inherent in the correlative rights
rule are avoided by a mandate that each landowner use water so as not to
cause unreasonable harm through lowering the water table or reducing
artesian pressure. 30 The result is self-apportionment based upon a natural
phenomenon, the lowering of the water table, rather than upon subjective
judgments as to the relative needs of competing users. The Second
Restatement proposes that landowners give up the right to remove all the
percolating water under their land in exchange for a guarantee of a
relatively constant water table. Another significant facet of this proposed
rule is the provision for sale and removal of ground water for uses not
connected to the land overlying the water source if this can be accom-
plished without unreasonable harm to other users. 31
The final approach to the allocation of percolating ground water is the
doctrine of prior appropriation developed in the arid western states.
32
Under this doctrine, water rights are not founded upon land ownership, but
are allocated on a "first-come, first-served" basis. 33 Each water user has a
right to a specific quantity of water with an accompanying priority based
upon the date on which the water was first appropriated for a beneficial
use. 34 Originally a product of judicial decision, the prior appropriation
doctrine is now embodied in comprehensive statutes in many of the states
adhering to its principles.
35
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the various states have taken
different approaches when faced with the problem of allocating water
among competing uses. Compounding the complexity of the common law
governing ground water, courts have applied various rules when dealing
with activities that, while not strictly considered competing uses, impact
upon ground waters. 36 For example, dewatering of soil and rock to allow
mining or other excavation was the prime issue in the fountainhead cases of
the American ground-water rule. Mining interferences with percolating
waters are governed by water law, rather than nuisance doctrine.
37
29. Id.; compare Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A and comment cat 157 (Tent. Draft
No. 17, 1971).
31. See id., comment c at 157-58.
32. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 13, at 29,54-55; I WATERS & WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 9, §§ 51.5-.7; 5 id. §§ 408.1, 441 (ed. 1972).
33. See sources cited note 32 supra.
34. See sources cited note 32 supra.
35. 1 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 22; 5 id. §§ 441-42 (ed. 1972); Hanks &
Hanks, supra note 14, at 648-49.
36. See, e.g., Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126A.2d403 (1956); Hauck v.
Tidewater Pipeline Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893); Reinhart v. Lancaster Area Refuse
Auth., 201 Pa. Super. 614, 193 A.2d 670 (1963).
37. See, e.g., Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528
(1855); DiGiacinto v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 27 Leh. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
III. Development of Pennsylvania Common Law of Ground Water
A. Distinction Between Subterranean Streams and Percolating Ground
Waters
The division of ground-water law from the riparian rights doctrines of
surface water began in England in 1843 with the case of Acton v.
Blundell.38 The English Court of Exchequer Chamber refused to apply
riparian principles to the dewatering of a well caused by pumping in an
adjacent mine:
[T]he person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all
that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and
pleasure; and . . . if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts
or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his
neighbour's well, this inconvenience to his neighbour falls within
the description of damnum absque injuria . ... 39
The court reasoned that ground water so differed from surface streams
that the riparian doctrines did not properly apply. The effects of one's
actions upon a surface stream are readily visible, but "the percolation and
underground flow of water are out of sight and their exact operation and
courses are conjectural ..... 40 The court feared that imposition of
liability on landowners who had no prior knowledge or understanding of
ground-water flow would tend to discourage the development of land.4'
Further support for the court's decision was found in the "ad coelum et ad
infernos" maxim, which gave a landowner absolute ownership of what
was below or above the surface of the land. The conclusion that one could
not be liable for making use of one's property, including underlying ground
water, logically followed.
42
In Wheatley v. Baugh,4 3 the first Pennsylvania ground water case, the
supreme court followed the general rationale of Acton,' but with two
important innovations. First, there could be no "ownership" of water as
described in Acton:
Neither the civil law nor the common law permits a man to be
deprived of a well or spring or stream of water for the mere
gratification of malice. The reason is, that water, like air, is of
such a nature that no one can have an exclusive right in it.
45
38. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
39. Id. at 1253.
40. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 525, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (1900), citing
Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
41. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1234 (Ex. 1843). Accord, Wheatley v.
Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 532 (1855); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514, 519 (1863).
42. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
Other courts have enunciated two additional rationales. First, "without grant or positive
statute there can be no easement in one parcel of land for the subsurface support or supply of
sub-surface water in another parcel .... ." Second, any damages caused to neighboring
water supplies by activities on one land would be the "remote or indirect consequence of
lawful acts" on that land and are therefore not actionable. Forbell v. City of New York, 164
N.Y. 522, 525, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (1900).
43. 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
44. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
45. 25 Pa. at 533.
Second, the Wheatley court distinguished underground streams from
percolations. It found that at least some underground streams were so well
defined that the reasoning of Acton was inapplicable.
[T]o entitle a stream to the consideration of the law it is certainly
necessary that it be a Watercourse. . . . Small as it may be, if it
have a clear and well defined channel. . . it can not be diverted
to the injury of proprietors below . . . . Each has a right to a
reasonable use of the water on his own premises, but he must so
exercise his privilege as not to injure the rights of the other.'
The Pennsylvania rule, therefore, distinguishes known underground
streams from percolating ground waters. When injury is foreseeable-that
is, when a well-defined subterranean stream exists-the Pennsylvania rule
developed in Wheatley applies the riparian rights doctrine of reasonable
use. 4 7 In the absence of foreseeability of injury, the general English rule of
nonliability for interference prevails. 48 Because there can be no absolute
ownership of waters, however, interferences with percolating ground
waters may be actionable if accompanied by malice or negligence.
49
Once Wheatley had outlined the legal distinction between under-
ground streams and percolating waters, the major problem confronting the
courts was what criteria to employ in establishing the existence of an
underground stream to which the doctrine of reasonable use would apply.
50
The early cases5' firmly relied upon the requirement of foreseeability: only
if there was some surface evidence of an underground stream should the
defendant anticipate the effects of interference. Thus in Lybe's Appeal52 it
was held that a plaintiff must prove that there was surface evidence of an
underground stream.
53
This strict requirement of surface indications was relaxed in response
to a constantly increasing body of hydrogeologic knowledge. In Collins v.
Chartiers Valley Gas Co.54 the court appeared ready to overthrow the
distinction between percolating waters and subterranean streams that had
pervaded Pennsylvania law since Wheatley.
46. Id. at 531.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012(1890) (liability
will not be imposed upon the actor if he did not intend the result, or if the reasonable man
would not have been able to foresee the result); Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884); Haldeman
v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); DiGiacinto v. New
Jersey Zinc Co., 27 Leh. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
49. See sources cited note 48 supra. When there is foreseeability, that is, when the actor
intends the probable result of his actions or the result is reasonably foreseeable even though
not intended, liability may be imposed. It is based on the malice and negligence exceptions to
the general English rule of nonliability.
50. Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863);
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); accord, Ross Common Water Co. v. Blue Mountain
Consol. Water Co., 228 Pa. 235, 77 A. 446 (1910); Heltman's Appeal, 4 Walk. 35 (Pa. 1882);
Bair v. Palm, 16 Pa. Dist. 487 (C.P. Perry 1906).
51. Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863).
52. 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
53. Id. at 634.
54. 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890).
[S]ince the decisions in Acton v. Blundell. . .and Wheatley v.
Baugh, probably more deep wells have been drilled in Western
Pennsylvania than had previously been dug in the'entire earth in
all time. And that which has then held to be necessarily
unknown, and merely speculative ... has been, by experience
in such cases as this, reduced almost to a certainty.55
Despite this seeming readiness to discard the old distinctions, the
court chose to base its decision upon a recognized exception to the rule of
nonliability espoused in Wheatley. Since the defendant knew that drilling
an oil well would release salt water and contaminate neighboring wells, his
drilling could be considered negligent. The significance of the Collins
decision was the recognition that the mass of geologic knowledge and data
accumulated by the oil company was sufficient to place a duty of reason-
able care on the firm. However, the archaic distinction between under-
ground streams and percolating waters remains a part of Pennsylvania law.
B. The Law of Springs and Subterranean Streams
1. Use of Spring Flows.-The usufructuary rights a landowner
possesses in springs that are located on his property depend on whether or
not the spring feeds a stream that crosses a boundary of his land. If the
stream crosses a boundary, the landowner's use of the spring will be
limited under riparian rights rules to reasonable use.56 If the spring water
merely flows over the land in an undefined channel or infiltrates the ground
before leaving the property, the landowner may use the water as he pleases,
absent malicious or negligent infliction of harm on a neighbor.
57
2. Reasonable Use Doctrine for Springs Forming Streams and
Known, Defined Subterranean Streams.-The law governing the use of
subterranean streams parallels that applicable to surface watercourses.
Both are ruled by the doctrine of riparian rights, 58 although "riparian"
technically refers to rights of owners of banks of surface streams. 9 The
riparian rights doctrine applicable to both surface watercourses and well-
defined, known subterranean streams has been substantially developed and
modified in the past 150 years.
60
Early Pennsylvania subterranean stream cases followed the "natural
flow" theory of riparian rights.6 If a "subterranean flow of water had
become so well defined as to constitute a regular and constant stream," the
overlying landowner had "no right to divert or destroy it, to the injury of
55. Id. at 159, 18 A. at 1013-14.
56. Brown v. Kistler, 190 Pa. 499,42 A. 885 (1899); Hopper v. Hopper, 146 Pa. 365, 23
A. 321 (1892); Lord v. Meadville Water Co., 135 Pa. 122, 19 A. 1007 (1890).
57. Cases cited note 56 supra.
58. Heltman's Appeal, 4 Walk. 35 (Pa. 1882); Whetstone v. Boswer, 29 Pa. 59 (1857);
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
59. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 13, at 28.
60. For a discussion'of the Pennsylvania surface-water riparian doctrine see Weston &
Gray, supra note 9, at 363-75.
61. See Whetstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. 59 (1857); Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298
(1855).
the person below.' 62 Each landowner had only a right to use the flow
without materially diminishing it in quantity or quality. 63
"A fusion (or perhaps confusion) of the language of English and
American rules is found in many of the later cases"64 as the Pennsylvania
courts shifted toward the "reasonable use" theory of riparian rights. Under
modern Pennsylvania law a riparian owner may divert, use, and consume
all of the water necessary for household and general domestic needs, even
though the flow of a watercourse is materially diminished or a small stream
is entirely consumed. 65 As stated in the charge of the trial court in Brown v.
Kistler, 
66
Every person through whose land a natural stream of water runs
has the right to the benefit of it as it passes through his land; he
has a right to obstruct it in passing over his lands. Each prop-
rietor may make any reasonable use of the water upon his
premises, he may diminish the quantity, but the use must be a
reasonable one.
. . What is a reasonable use of the water depends upon the
circumstances of each case, and is a question for the jury; the
character of the stream, the purpose to which water is applied,
and the manner of application are important considerations in
determining this question.
67
Some applications of water are regarded as "extraordinary." These
include manufacturing and milling uses and diversions for public and
recreational use. In the application of water to "extraordinary" purposes, a
riparian owner is limited to a quantity that is reasonable in view of the rights
of other riparian owners and that will not materially or perceptibly diminish
the flow of the watercourse.
68
The focus of the early decisions was maintenance of natural condi-
tions and avoidance of damage to other users, while in the later decisions
emphasis was placed on the reasonableness of the use causing damage. The
rule developed in the later cases recognizes that in some instances there is
simply not enough water for all uses. The solution to the problem is to give
the water to the upper riparian owner as long as his use and manner of use is
reasonable.
62. Whetstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. 59, 65 (1857).
63. Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298 (1855). It can be reasonably assumed that the
"natural flow" theory would also prohibit interference with a spring feeding a surface stream
to the extent that such interference materially altered the quantity or quality of the water flow.
64. Weston & Gray, supra note 9, at 365-66 (citing sources).
65. Brown v. Kistler, 190 Pa. 499,42 A. 885(1899); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 112 Pa.
34, 3 A. 780 (1886); Lancaster Milling Co. v. Media Heights Golf Club, 59 Lanc. 159 (Pa. C.P.
1964) (dicta).
66. 190 Pa. 499, 42 A. 885 (1899) (reprinted and approved).
67. Id. at 504-05.
68. Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Supply Co., 280 Pa. 482, 124 A. 747 (1924);
Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 240 Pa. 604, 88 A. 24 (1913) (dicta);
Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 145 Pa. 438,22 A. 989(1891); Brown v. Kistler, 190 Pa. 499,42 A.
885 (1899); Filbert v. Dechert, 22 Pa. Super. 362 (1903); Standard Plate Glass Co. v. Butler
Water Co., 5 Pa. Super. 563 (1897); Hollister v. Erie & Wyoming Valley R.R., II Lack. Jur.
247 (Pa. C.P. 1910).
What constitutes a reasonable use is a question of fact. 69 In Bair v.
Palm70 the court found it unreasonable to tap a spring connected to and
feeding another spring by a subterranean channel. Defendant was liable,
not because of diminishing the supply of the channel, but for wasting
water. Thus the manner of use was unreasonable. In Ross Common Water
Co. v. Blue Mountain Consolidated Water Co.71 defendant had installed
artesian wells on its land to supply water for industrial users in a nearby
town. The wells intercepted an underground watercourse and cut off the
flow of plaintiff's spring. Defendant, Ross Common Water Company, not
having used its powers of eminent domain, was relegated to the same
position as any other landowner. The court enjoined the pumping of the
wells on the theory that the company's use of the water for a purpose
unrelated to the land from which it was taken was unreasonable.
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Similarly, in Schaeffer v. Borough of Mt. Penn73 the court awarded
damages for the permanent destruction of plaintiff's spring after it was
shown that the spring was fed by a known underground channel that had
been cut off by the borough during sewer excavations. The borough's
interference with the stream was found unreasonable.
As these cases indicate, the rule governing use of well-defined,
known underground streams and springs feeding surface streams is the
riparian reasonable use doctrine of surface streams. 4 Each riparian owner
has a right to use the water so long as he does so in a reasonable manner.
The primary test for reasonableness is whether or not the water is being
used in a natural or ordinary manner in development or use of the land on
which the water is located. 75 This determination of reasonableness on the
basis of the "naturalness" of the use, as will be shown later, has its origin
in antiquated policies and legal fiction, defies rationalization, and is no
longer a viable index for solving water rights problems.
3. Prescriptive Rights in Subterranean Streams.-Title to a piece
of property or right to use a resource such as surface or ground water may
be acquired by adverse possession or prescriptive use. 7 6 These doctrines
are derived from the statute of limitations that prohibits an action to recover
an interest in land after the land has been in the use or possession of another
for twenty-one years or more.
77
69. Brown v. Kistler, 190 Pa. 499, 42 A. 885 (1899).
70. 16 Pa. Dist. 487 (C.P. Perry 1906).
71. 228 Pa. 235, 77 A. 446 (1910).
72. For a discussion of surface-water cases prohibiting use off riparian lands, see
Weston & Gray, supra note 9, at 369 nn. 106-09.
73. 32 Berks 63 (Pa. C.P. 1939).
74. See Heltman's Appeal, 4 Walk. 35 (Pa. 1882); Whetstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. 59
(1857).
75. Ross Common Water Co. v. Blue Mountain Consol. Water Co., 228 Pa. 235, 77 A.
446 (1910); Brown v. Kistler, 190 Pa. 499,42 A. 885 (1899); Schaeffer v. Borough of Mt. Penn,
32 Berks 63 (Pa. C.P. 1939); Bair v. Palm, 16 Pa. Dist. 487 (C.P. Perry 1906).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 72 (1953); W. BURBY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 31 (3d ed. 1954); 1 W. WALSH, COMMENTARIESON THE LAWOF REAL PROPERTY §
65 (1947); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 2-3 (1972).
77. Sources cited note 76 supra. Theoretically there is a difference between adverse
It was clear at common law that there could be no prescriptive rights in
unknown underground streams. Such streams were presumed to be per-
colating ground waters 78 and, as will be discussed in a later section, were
considered impossible to possess or use adversely.
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In contrast, the law of prescriptive rights for known subterranean
streams is the same as that for surface streams. 80 For example, it was held
in Whetstone v. Bowser81 that defendant had gained a prescriptive right to
certain waters by diverting a known underground stream that fed plaintiff's
spring. The diversion was considered to be an act constituting continuous,
open, and notorious violation of plaintiff's riparian interests in the well-
defined subterranean stream.
The extent to which each of the parties must be aware of the existence
and flow direction of an underground stream before the stream can be
subject to an adverse use was not defined in Whetstone, but appears to have
been resolved in Bair v. Palm.82 Bairdistinguished the rule of Whetstone83
and Lybe 's Appeal84 that no one could acquire, upon the land of another,
rights that were imperceptible or unknown:
[I]t was not necessary that for twenty years they and their
predecessors in title should know the line or course of its channel
any more than one having a prescriptive right of way is bound to
know for twenty years that the surface of the road was supported
by limestone, sandstone or clay .... 85
Although it is not required that the parties know the exact channel, it
appears that the parties must know that there is a channel, or knowledge of
its existence must be reasonably attainable, during the adverse use.
The use must be adverse to the interests of other users, yet it does not
appear that it must be adverse to an actual use by another. The amount of
the prescriptive right is limited, however, to the amount that was continu-
ally taken for a period of twenty-one years. 86 But, in the case of an
underground stream, no prescriptive rights may be acquired if the connec-
tion between a present adverse use and another's right of use is
undiscoverable.
possession and prescriptive rights. The former is limited to the gaining of a fee simple and the
latter is concerned with lesser interests in land. The doctrine of adverse possession is derived
from a bar against the institution of an action to recover title to land after twenty-one years. In
the majority of the states the statutes are not concerned with interests less than fee simple, but
have been extended by courts to bar actions to regain lesser interests in land. Pennsylvania's
statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 72 (1953), appears to include such non-fee interests and has
been so construed by the courts.
The use or possession of another's property, of course, must be open, notorious, and
continuous for the prescribed period. W. BURBY, supra note 76, § 268; W. WALSH, supra note
79, § 17; 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession §§ 25, 48-53, 149-205 (1972).
78. Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884); see notes 50-55 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 133-49 and accompanying text infra.
80. See Weston & Gray, supra note 9, at 376-79.
81. 29 Pa. 59 (1857).
82. 16 Pa. Dist. 487 (C.P. Perry 1906).
83. Whetstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. 59 (1857).
84. 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
85. Bair v. Palm, 16 Pa. Dist. 487, 489 (C.P. Perry 1906).
86. Whetstone v. Bowser, 29 Pa. 59 (1857).
C. The Law of Percolating Ground Waters
In examining the rules governing allocation of percolating waters, it
would be logical to begin with the laws governing competing use between
adjoining landowners. In Pennsylvania as in other eastern states, however,
the first water laws developed as a result of interferences caused by mining
activities. Consequently, the law of competing use developed from that
governing mining disputes. To understand the doctrines and policies that
have shaped Pennsylvania ground water law, it is necessary to examine the
development of these rules chronologically. Five aspects of competing
ground water uses will be discussed.
1. Interferences from Mining on Adjacent Lands.-The industrial
revolution of the nineteenth century brought a need for increasingly large
quantities of raw materials. Many of these materials were obtained by deep
mining. The removal of earth and rock from the mine shafts often
destroyed underground water retaining beds and aquifers. It was not
unusual for miners to encounter ground water, requiring pumping to lower
water tables if mining were to continue.
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The effect of mining upon ground-water flow patterns gave rise to the
early English and American cases on ground-water law. The English rule
of absolute ownership of all water beneath one's land was announced in a
mining case, Acton v. Blundell.88 Another mining case, Wheatley v.
Baugh,89 established Pennsylvania's rule of nonliability absent proof of
negligent or malicious interference with percolating ground water.
Two factors weighed significantly in the development of the mine
dewatering rules: foreseeability, and a policy of encouraging economic
development. While the impact of withdrawals from surface streams was
predictable, the effects of withdrawing percolating ground water were not
commonly known. 90 With landowners unable to foresee harm to neighbor-
ing owners, liability would have to be imposed absolutely or not at all. If it
were imposed, the possibility of being held responsible for unpredictable
damage to others might deter the pursuit of mining and other development
by landowners and investors. 91 As seen by the court, it was unreasonable
for an owner to prevent a neighbor from enjoying land "in the ordinary
way," that is, from engaging in ordinary and natural use and development.
Early in the industrial revolution mining was determined by the Pennsyl-
vania courts to be an "ordinary and natural" use of land. Unforeseeable
interferences with percolating ground water caused by such ordinary and
natural uses as mining were to be treated as damnum absque injuria, not as
unlawful .92
87. See I. STATHAM, COAL MINING 464 (1956).
88. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
89. 25 Pa. 528 (1855). See also Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863).
90. Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 535
(1855).
91. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 535 (1855).
92. Id. at 533; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863).
The rule established by the early Pennsylvania cases retains vitality,
and as recently as 1957 it was held to be controlling in DiGiacinto v. New
Jersey Zinc Co.9 3 A controversy arose when pumping efforts in a zinc mine
severely reduced the water level in wells of adjacent landowners. The court
found that since no amount of care could have prevented the injury the
defendant mining company was not negligent. Nor could the plaintiff
establish malice in the defendant's continued pumping, since malice
requires more than mere knowledge of the result of one's activity. In this
case it would require that the pumping be for some purpose other than a
legal or economic use. The court's remarks on the ancient rule it felt
compelled to follow were enlightening.
The plaintiffs maintain that. . . Pennsylvania is gradually
swinging away from the apparent harshness of the English rule
as laid down in Wheatley v. Baugh and asks that the so-called
doctrine of 'correlative rights' be applied in this case. This
principle appears to be that the theory of absolute ownership is
not well founded and is not so commended by its practical
application as to require its adoption, and that the better rule is
that the rights of each owner being similar, and their enjoyment
dependent on the action of other landowners, their rights must be
correlative and subject to the maxim that 'one must so use his
own as not to injure another' so that each landowner is restricted
to a reasonable exercise of his rights and a reasonable use of his
own property, in view of the similar rights of others. . . . It may
be that the impact of our modern economy and changing social
concepts require a reexamination of what we believe to be the
settled law of Pennsylvania but the adoption of the 'correlative
rights' doctrine is obviously the responsibility of authority
superior to ours. We are not unsympathetic to the problems
which have arisen in the Saucon Valley as a result of the
defendant's mining operation but their solution must come from
either the appellate courts or the legislative branch of our state
government. 94
The Wheatley rule has outlived its rationale. It is obvious that the
defendant in DiGiacinto intended to draw down the water table and knew
that this was likely to affect neighboring wells. The Wheatley rule was
designed to protect the developers of land from unpredictable liability.
Today the result of such pumping is predictable; the rule has lost its
foundation and viability.
2. Interferences from Competing Uses.-There are very few cases
dealing with the conflict between adjoining landowners who each with-
draw ground water and put it to use on their overlying land. Lybe's
Appeal95 and Williams v. Ladew96 are the only such cases in Pennsyl-
vania; both were decided before 1900.
In Lybe's Appeal 97 defendant had purchased a piece of plaintiff's land
93. 27 Leh. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
94. Id. at 316-17. For a discussion of the correlative rights doctrine see notes 22-24 and
accompanying text supra.
95. 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
96. 161 Pa. 283 (1894).
97. 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
subject to plaintiff's reservation of a right to draw water from a spring.
After defendant installed a well for his own use the spring went dry. The
court, citing Wheatley,98 ruled that there could be no liability in the
absence of evidence indicating either that defendant had acted maliciously
or that the source of the spring was so obvious that the interference could be
considered unreasonable. Hence, the Wheatley rule, originally adopted to
govern interferences caused by mining, was applied to competing uses. A
landowner could take as much water as he wished regardless of the
consequences to his neighbor so long as he acted without malice or
negligence.
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In Williams v. Ladew, 1°° the only other Pennsylvania case dealing
with such competing uses on adjoining properties, plaintiff had created a
tunnel that later proved useful for the collection of water. Defendant in turn
dug his own tunnel, and plaintiff's subsequently went dry. Adhering to the
rule of Lybe's Appeal,'0' the court held that defendant was not liable
absent malice or negligence.
If a landowner withdraws water and uses it, or sells it for use,
beyond the bounds of the property from which it is drawn, a dramatically
different rule has been applied. A series of Pennsylvania municipal water
supply cases have stated that a withdrawal that adversely affects neighbor-
ing springs and wells supplied by percolating water is per se unreasonable
if the water is to be used beyond the overlying land. 02 Wheatley has been
distinguished on the basis that a diversion of water beyond the overlying
land does not constitute an "ordinary or natural use." '03 This off-land/on-
land, natural/unnatural distinction, however, renders the Wheatley
rationale meaningless. Liability is imposed on a municipal or off-land user
whether or not damage to others can be foreseen, yet an on-land ground-
water user may escape responsibility for reasons of inability to foresee the
same kind of damage or interference.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with this distinction in
Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co."° in 1940. In so doing the court
98. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
99. Accord, Williams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283 (1894). In Williams the court held that a
landowner could dig a tunnel to collect water yet be free from liability to an adjoining
landowner whose own tunnel was thereby dewatered. Neither malice nor reasonable
foreseeability was established.
100. 161 Pa. 283 (1894).
101. 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
102. Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); Craig v.
Shippensburg Borough, 7 Pa. Super. 526 (1898); Flowers v. Northampton Bucks Cty. Mun.
Auth., 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 274(C.P. Bucks 1972); Hatfield Twp. v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 19Pa.
D. & C.2d 281 (C.P. Montg. 1959), aff'd, 403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961); Davison v.
Shenandoah Borough, 38 Pa. County Ct. 697 (C.P. Schuyl. 1911); Stone v. Providence Gas &
Water Co., 13 Pa. Dist. 557 (C.P. Lack 1904).
The Wheatley doctrine was distinguished on the basis that diversion of water from the
land was not an "ordinary and natural" use. For a discussion of Wheatley see notes 43-49,
89-92 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 102 supra.
104. 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940).
completed the shift of Pennsylvania ground-water law from the English
rule of absolute ownership to the American rule:' 
05
[T]he marked tendency in American jurisdictions in later years
has been away from the doctrine that the owner's right to
sub-surface waters is unqualified; on the contrary there has been
an ever-increasing acceptance of the viewpoint that their use
must be limited to purposes incident to the beneficial enjoyment
of the land from which they are obtained, and if their diversion or
sale to others away from the land impairs the supply of a spring
or well . . . of another, such use is not for a 'lawful purpose'
within the general rule. . ., but constitutes an actionable wrong
for which damages are recoverable. 106
After Rothrauff the question remained whether relief other than
damages might be appropriate for ground-water interferences. In a deci-
sion reached prior to Rothrauff, a lower Pennsylvania court had refused to
issue an injunction against the withdrawal of water on the ground that the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. 107 Fifty years later the supreme
court came to a similar result, 0 8 ordering a municipal water system to
connect without charge all water users who had been adversely affected by
the water system's withdrawals of percolating water.' °9 The supreme
court's balancing of equities resembles the principles applied in the
correlative rights rule,l I° although rationalized within the dogmas of the
American rule. In essence the court held that no landowner has an absolute
right to prevent another from making productive use of the resource simply
because water is diverted off the overlying land, but that the interests and
needs of the parties must be balanced. The affected landowner may receive
damages, but he has no automatic right to prevent the off-land use.
It is difficult to predict the result that would be reached in a modern
suit between adjoining "on-land" users, or, for that matter, between
adjoining owners who both use water beyond their own land, because there
have been no cases between private users since 1900. Under a strict
application of the American rule, it would seem that there would be no
liability in either of these situations. Owners would be entitled to take
whatever they could get; the deepest well and strongest pump would win.
This appears to be the present state of the law in Pennsylvania, but in light
of the decisions just discussed, it would not be unreasonable to suggest a
movement toward a more equitable solution if and when such conflicts
arise.
3. Interferences from Multiple Activities on the Same Land. -Two
categories of conflicts arise between parties who hold separate interests in a
single parcel of land. The first concerns the relative rights of surface
105. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
106. 339 Pa. at 134, 14 A.2d at 90 (emphasis added).
107. Davison v. Shenandoah Borough, 38 Pa. County Ct. 697 (C.P. Schuyl. 1911).
108. Hatfield Twp. v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961), aff'g, 19
Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (C.P. Montg. 1959).
109. Id.
110. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
owners and holders of subsurface mineral rights when mining interferes
with the surface owner's ground water use. The second derives from other
shared interests in land, including rights in water underlying highway and
railroad easements and rights to install wells through subsurface strata
controlled by mineral owners.
In the first category, the rules governing the responsibility of subsur-
face mineral owners for interferences with a surface owner's water uses
were derived from doctrines developed to resolve property damages caused
to surface lands by mining operations." The general rule is that, as in the
case of other mining interferences, there can be no liability for damage to
percolating water unless the miner acts negligently or maliciously. 1 2 This
is essentially the Wheatley rule discussed earlier."
3
There is, however, an important exception to this rule. If the surface
and subsurface rights have been severed and are held by different persons,
the owner of the subsurface mineral rights has a duty to support-the surface
lands. 114 The subsurface owner is entitled only to so much of the minerals
as he can obtain without injury to the superincumbent soil. If a mine
operator fails to provide necessary surface support and this causes subsi-
dence or disturbance of overlying strata, the miner will be strictly liable for
all resulting damages" 5 including interferences with surface and ground
water.
This exception was applied in Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co. 16 Plaintiff
had leased the coal beneath his land, reserving rights of support. Defen-
dant, failing to replace support after removing the coal, caused surface
subsidence and loss of a well and three springs. The court concluded that
when
the owner of the coal undertakes the mine and remove it-as he
has an undoubted right to do-and damage results to the surface,
either (a) from negligence in conducting his mining operations,
or (b) from failure to properly and sufficiently support the
surface, or (c) from both these causes combined, the surface
owner is entitled to recover compensation for such injury as he
may show he has sustained .... 117
This liability was held to include the destruction of surface springs."
8
The right to surface support is absolute. When failure to maintain
support results in injury to ground-water supplies, liability does not require
negligent or malicious conduct by the defendant miner. 119 The miner may
11l. See, e.g., Jones v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429 (1870) (holding the extractor of subsurface
minerals has a duty to support the surface and will be liable for damages to the surface as a
result of failure to maintain proper support).
112. Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 229 Pa. 417, 429, 78 A. 1004, 1008 (1911).
113. See notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
114. Joneses v. Wagner, 66 Pa. 429 (1870).
115. Id.
116. 172 Pa. 438, 33 A. 690 (1896).
117. Id. at 438, 33 A. at 690 (emphasis added).
118, Id. at 439, 33 A. at 690.
119. Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 229 Pa. 417, 427, 78 A. 1004, 1007 (1911).
be held liable for negligence in mining or may be held strictly liable for
damages caused by failure to provide support. In the latter case, no fault on
the part of the miner need be shown; only the lack of sufficient support
must be demonstrated.1
20
The surface owner must, however, prove causation between the
surface damage and lack of support. 12' To establish causation it is
necessary to show (1) the removal of support pillars from the mine (i. e., all
the coal),'122 (2) some surface subsidence or cracking, 123 and (3) a reason-
ably coincident loss of water. 124 If there is no subsidence, no disturbance of
the superincumbent strata or no relationship of damage to lack of support,
there is no causation and the surface owner is put in the same position as a
landowner whose percolations have been cut off by mining on adjacent
land:' 25 interference will not be actionable in the absence of malice or
negligence on the part of the mine operator. 126
Related cases of multiple use of land do not involve support rights. In
Upper Ten Mile Plank Road Co. v. Braden,'27 for example, a road
company built a highway over plaintiff's land on an easement acquired by
eminent domain. While building the road the company uncovered a spring,
enclosed it and diverted it off the land. The court held that the original
owner of the land was entitled to the water, 128 finding that although a
highway easement restricts the manner in which the landowner may use a
spring, it does not negate the right of use. The landowner may do with the
spring as he pleases so long as he does not injure the road. The road
company, by power of eminent domain, acquires only such rights as are
necessary to build and maintain the highway. 2 9
The right of a surface owner to tap underground water through severed
mineral strata was raised in Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co. v. Lehigh
120. Id. at 427-28, 78 A. at 1007.
121. Hoffman v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 265 Pa. 476, 109 A. 234 (1920).
122. See Hornick v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 307 Pa. 264, 161 A. 75 (1932); Alwine v.
Valley Smokeless Coal Co., 271 Pa. 571, 115 A. 882 (1922); Hoffman v. Berwind-White Coal
Co., 265 Pa. 476, 109 A. 234 (1920); Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 216 Pa. 195, 65 A. 545
(1907); Kistler v. Thompson, 158 Pa. 139, 27 A. 874 (1893).
123. See Hornick v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 307 Pa. 264, 161 A. 75 (1932); Alwine v.
Valley Smokeless Coal Co., 271 Pa. 571, 115 A. 882 (1922); Pringle v. Vesta Coal Co., 172 Pa.
438, 33 A. 690 (1896); Kistler v. Thompson, 158 Pa. 139, 27 A. 874 (1893); Coleman v.
Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875).
124. See Alwine v. Valley Smokeless Coal Co., 271 Pa. 571, 115 A. 882 (1922); Hoffman
v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 265 Pa. 476, 109 A. 234 (1920).
125. See Householder v. Quemahoning, 272 Pa. 78, 116 A. 40 (1922); Trout v. Mac-
Donald, 83 Pa. 144 (1876); Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875).
126. See notes 89-94 and accompanying text supra.
In the last forty years, no cases involving mining interference with percolating ground
waters have litigated the absolute duty of surface support. Apparently the use of waivers of
the right to surface support has prevented such litigation. If such a waiver has been executed,
the surface owner will have no right of action for interference with percolating ground water
unless malice or negligence can be shown.
127. 172 Pa. 460, 33 A. 562 (1896).
128. Id. at 466, 33 A. at 563.
129. Accord, Dilts v. Plumville R.R., 222 Pa. 516, 71 A. 1072 (1909).
Valley Coal Co. '3 0 The surface owner's well was destroyed during coal
mining. The court decided that "the owner of land who has conveyed to
another the underlying coal was entitled to access to the strata beneath the
coal." '13 1 In essence, the surface owner was found to have an implied
easement through the coal strata to reach underlying ground water. The
factual finding that destruction of the well was avoidable and negligent
supported a judgment for the surface owner.
It is clear from these cases that special problems may arise from
conflicting ground-water uses of persons holding separate interests in the
same piece of land. While the general Wheatley rule13 2 governs water
conflicts arising out of multiple uses of land, special rules have been
developed giving particular rights and duties to owners of varied interests
in land. Most important, the doctrine of absolute right to surface support
has given surface owners the ability to recover without proof of negligence
or malice for damages to percolating ground waters caused by disturbance
of underlying strata.
4. Prescriptive Rights in Percolating Ground Waters.-No one
may acquire rights in ground water by prescription without having made
notorious and adverse use of water in violation of another's rights.
133
Moreover, prescriptive water use rights can be obtained only if the person
whose uses are adversely affected has a legal right to obtain judicial
redress-a cause of action-which that person has failed to assert. 1 34 Thus,
to acquire a prescriptive right to use ground water, one must claim and use
such a right in violation of the legally protected interests of another user or
owner.
Under the common-law rules governing percolating ground water, it
is virtually impossible for one landowner's use to be legally adverse to the
rights of an adjacent owner. Both the English and American rules hold that
a landowner has a right to intercept and remove all percolating ground
water that is applied to lawful use on that land.' 35 As a corollary, no
neighboring owner has a right to damages or equitable relief for interfer-
ence caused by diversion of percolating ground water unless such interfer-
ence is malicious or negligent, or the diversion is for some "unlawful" or
"unreasonable" purpose, 136 such as use off the land overlying the
aquifer.137 Thus, use of percolating ground water on the overlying land,
even in large amounts, does not give rise to a cause of action on behalf of
adversely affected neighbors, and no prescriptive rights can be obtained to
continue such use.
130. 250 Pa. 300, 95 A. 471 (1915).
131. Id. at 302, 95 A. at 471-72.
132. See notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
133. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
134. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 28 (1972).
135. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843); see notes 15-21, 38-49 and
accompanying text supra.
136. Sources cited note 135 supra.
137. See notes 102-10 and accompanying text supra.
The typical pattern of prescriptive rights cases is seen in Wheatley v.
Baugh.'3 8 Plaintiff had used a spring continuously for more than twenty-
one years (the time period for prescriptive rights). 13 9 Subsequently, his
neighbor commenced copper mining and dewatered the aquifer from which
the well had drawn percolating ground water. Despite the general rule that
mining is a reasonable and natural use of land and that a mine operator is
not liable for dewatering, 'I Wheatley claimed that his prior continuous
use of the spring gave rise to a prescriptive right to waters in the aquifer and
entitled him to damages for injury to that right. The court denied that
plaintiff had acquired a prescriptive right. He merely had acted as he had a
right to act, using the water under his own land. Since he had not interfered
with any legal rights of his neighbors during his more than twenty-one
years of spring use, he had acquired no prescriptive rights against them. 4 '
It is evident that in order to obtain a prescriptive right one must act in a
manner contrary to another's right. Under present Pennsylvania law, the
consumption of percolations off the overlying land 4 2 or any use of
percolations that interferes with surface waters14 3 is legally "unreason-
able" and actionable. Presumably such interferences, if continued for
twenty-one years without resolution by the courts, could ripen into
prescriptive rights, but the courts have not ruled upon such a case.
It is not clear whether even in the presence of unlawful interferences
there can arise a prescriptive right in percolating waters. For example, in
Lybe's Appeal"4 it was questioned whether prescriptive rights to the
continued flow of an unknown subterranean stream had arisen. The court
responded:
The rule is, that wherever the stream is so hidden in the earth that
its course is not discoverable from the surface, there can be no
such thing as a prescription in favor of an adjacent proprietor to
138. 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 72 (1953); see notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
140. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843); notes 38-49, 88-94 and accom-
panying text supra.
141. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 533-34 (1855):
The prior occupancy of the spring for the uses of a tannery, gave no right of servitude
over or through the land of the adjacent proprietor. No man, by mere prior
enjoyment of the advantages of his own land, can establish a servitude upon the land
of another. . . . But it seems to be thought that the enjoyment of the spring by the
plaintiff below and those under whom he claims, for the period of twenty-one years,
gives him a right to its continued existence, although the neighboring proprietor may
thereby be deprived of the chief value of his own land. This depends upon the
question whether the enjoyment of the spring was of such a character as to have
invaded his neighbour's rights, so as to enable the latter to maintain an action for the
injury. No man can be barred by a statute of limitations for not bringing his action
with[in] the prescribed period, until it is first shown that he had a cause of action
which he could have maintained. In analogy to the statute, no presumption can arise
against a party on the ground of long enjoyment of a privilege by another, until it is
shown that the privilege, in some measure, interfered with the rights of the party
whose grant is proposed to be presumed, and that he had a legal right to prevent such
enjoyment by proceedings at law.
142. See notes 102-10 and accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 246-51 and accompanying text infra.
144. 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
have an uninterrupted flow of such stream through the land of his
neighbor. 1
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This formulation would appear to suggest that no prescriptive right may be
obtained to ground water in other than a well-defined subterranean stream
because the adverse use is theoretically undiscoverable and, thus, never
actionable. As noted earlier, 146 the court's assumption of insurmountable
problems in showing causation and in understanding the flow patterns of
ground waters has been largely dissipated. Modern decisions, including
Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co. ,147 have recognized the scientific and
technical advances which now make systematic consideration of ground-
water relationships possible, but this modern approach has not yet been
applied to a prescriptive rights case.
The current status of Pennsylvania's common law on the subject of
prescriptive rights in percolating ground waters is unclear. It is reasonable
to assume that under the Wheatley doctrine, 148 a prescriptive right may be
gained when there is an actionable interference with ground water.
Pennsylvania's adoption of the American rule would imply that prescrip-
tive rights could be obtained if the person claiming such rights uses water
off the land overlying the aquifer, or if the interference with another's
water use is malicious or negligent. As the American rule is modified to
provide further protection to ground-water users, the possibility of acquir-
ing prescriptive rights to use such waters adverse to another's interests will
increase correspondingly. 1
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5. Pollution of Ground Water.-Two important trends can be
observed in Pennsylvania ground-water pollution decisions. The first is
adherence to a distinction between "natural" and "non-natural" activities
on land 5 ° similar to that enunciated in competing water use cases. I5 1 The
second incorporates the parallel and often intertwined development of
property doctrines governing ground-water allocation and use and tort
doctrines of nuisance applicable to pollution interferences. A careful
examination of these trends is necessary to understand current problems
inherent in Pennsylvania's ground-water laws.
The first important Pennsylvania water pollution case, Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson,152 announced that damages to an adjoining
145. Id. at 634.
146. See notes 38-55 and accompanying text supra.
147. 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012 (1890).
148. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); see notes 43-49, 89-92 and accompanying text
supra.
149. See, e.g., Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 144 Cal. 578, 77 P.
1113 (1904) (defendant had a prescriptive right to intercept percolations feeding a river which
plaintiff used for water supply).
150. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); notes 177-84
and accompanying text infra.
151. See Williams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283 (1894); Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884);
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); notes 95-110 and accompanying text supra.
152. 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
landowner as the result of natural and lawful use of one's land were not
actionable in the absence of malice or negligence. Sanderson is often cited
for the proposition that there can be no liability for pollution resulting from
a "natural" use of land. 53 This is incorrect. Liability will be incurred for
foreseeable, avoidable damage arising from a "natural" activity.
5 4
Although Sanderson did not discuss the requirements for imposing
liability for pollution arising from "non-natural" activities on land, the
parallel development of water use law and pollution rules is evident. In
both areas, a policy preference was given to "natural" uses of land,
particularly mining. 155 Moreover, the early common-law rule applied to
pollution of water resulting from natural uses was identical to the Wheatley
rule 156 governing mining interference with ground-water flows. Indeed,
the Wheatley rationale, which had developed in the context of competing
ground-water uses, became the guiding principle for Sanderson and its
progeny.
Some seventy years after the Sanderson decision was rendered, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined pollution of percolating waters
resulting from a "non-natural" use of land. In Burr v. Adam Eidemiller,
Inc.,' 57 a road company had mixed materials on a lot adjoining plaintiff's
property. Water from this activity seeped into the ground and polluted
plaintiff's pond, spring and water supply. The court chose to apply the
rules of nuisance outlined in section 822 of the Restatement of Torts:
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or
ultrahazardous conduct.1
5 8
Under section (d) the court found that the invasion was intentional and
unreasonable; defendant had continued its activity despite complaints by
153. See, e.g., Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 304 Pa. 583,589,156 A. 240,242(1931):
Where dangerous gases accumulate on a property from its lawful use in mining
coal, and where it is reasonably foreseeable that such gas may escape and injure
persons on adjoining property, there is an affirmative duty on the owner toprevent, if
possible, the escape of such gases to his neighbor's property. We have so held with
regard to water coming from mines which drains into streams used as public drinking
supplies: P.R.R. Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233. To that extent, the case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, and all other Sanderson Cases
treating the subject, have been overruled. (emphasis added)
154. 113 Pa. at 151,6A. at461.
155. See id.; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528
(1855).
156. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
157. 386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956).
158. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
plaintiff, and the resultant pollution was avoidable.159
The Pennsylvania decisions have consistently followed the Restate-
ment rules of nuisance to the extent pollution is caused by non-natural
activities. 16 Under the Restatement formulation liability may be imposed
for ground-water pollution if the defendant's action is intentional and
unreasonable, or if such action is negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous.
The Sanderson- Wheatley doctrine may reach the same result in cases
of ground-water pollution caused by the "natural" activity of a landowner.
If a landowner is engaged in a "natural" activity, but conducts it
negligently so as to cause foreseeable pollution or other interference with
another's water use, the Sanderson- Wheatley rule would hold him
responsible. 161
Whether the activity is "natural" or not, the interference must be
foreseeable and avoidable to support a finding of negligence, for there can
be no duty of care if no amount of care could prevent the interference. 1
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Thus, the natural/non-natural distinction is moot as applied to negligent
interferences with ground water created by dewatering, diversion or
pollution.
Curiously it is in the area of intentional and unreasonable conduct that
the dichotomy between "natural" and "non-natural" becomes important.
A landowner engaged in a non-natural activity that causes pollution will be
held liable if he continues his conduct after receiving notice of the resulting
damage to other properties.' 63 Continuation of a nuisance after notice is
treated as intentional by the Restatement rule; proof of the actor's mali-
cious intent to harm others is unnecessary. 164 in contrast, a landowner who
continues an activity that is deemed "natural," even after he has notice of
resulting pollution, is not liable for interference with another's water
supply unless the damage is intended with malice or is clearly foreseeable
and avoidable. 165 Under the Sanderson- Wheatley rule, mere notice of the
harm does not make the continued conduct intentional, or the damage
foreseeable. 166
The dichotomy results in a major difference in the treatment accorded
non-negligent, continuing conduct that causes pollution of ground water.
159. 386 Pa. at 420, 126 A.2d at 406.
160. See Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956); Reinhart v.
Lancaster Area Refuse Auth., 201 Pa. Super. 614, 193 A.2d 670(1963); Bumbarger v. Walker,
193 Pa. Super. 301, 164 A.2d 144 (1960).
161. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); Wheatley v.
Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
162. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886); DiGiacinto v.
New Jersey Zinc Co., 27 Leh. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
Explanatory Note § 822, comment b at 28 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971) (explaining that
considerations of reasonableness are inherently included in a negligence inquiry and, there-
fore, this element was not explicitly included in § 822(d)(ii) of the first RESTATEMENT).
163. Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 386 Pa. 416, 126 A.2d 403 (1956).
164. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
165. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
166. Id.; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
Negligence allegations, which require proof of a defendant's failure to take
reasonable care in mining or other activities, are difficult to support.
Consequently, negligence actions for ground-water pollution are rare.
Complaints for intentional nusiance, in which proof of notice to the
defendant and continuation of the conduct are the central elements, are far
easier to plead and prove. Accordingly, the dichtomy of rules has generally
resulted in relieving "natural" activities of liability for pollution while
making "non-natural" activities actionable, a distinction that is arbitrary
at best. 
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The adoption of different pollution rules for natural and non-natural
activities resulting in pollution was a reflection of two conflicting legal
maxims regarding land interests. The protection of natural uses of land is
based in the maxim "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
infernos" (he who owns the soil owns it to the sky and to the depths).
Nuisance law is based in the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus"
(use your property so as not to injure others). The former is a doctrine of
absolute ownership and absolute rights, the foundation of Wheatley,
Sanderson, and most of the rules governing ground-water use. 168 The latter
recognizes the interdependence of people and uses, and the need to
accommodate competing interests in the development and management of
common resources.
This conflict in doctrine and policy appears to have been resolved by
the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co. 69 The
Commonwealth alleged that defendant's drainage of acid mine water into a
stream resulted in pollution. The coal company defended on the rationale
of Sanderson. 170 After noting that Barnes & Tucker was being sued for a
public nuisance while Sanderson was a private nuisance case, the court
said: "In any event we find that even with regard to the facts of Sanderson,
the legal doctrine enunciated in that case is no longer viable."'
7'1
This is a clear renunciation of Sanderson and a rejection of its
underlying rationale, including the Wheatley doctrine 172 and the "ad
coelum" maxim. The court found that the coal company was liable to the
Commonwealth under principles of common-law and statutory public
nuisance. The public interest in maintaining the integrity of all the waters
of the state was sufficient, by itself, to support such an action. 171
Under the present law, as announced by Barnes & Tucker,174 no
person may discharge polluted waters into the waters of the Common-
wealth. The natural/non-natural distinction is defunct for purposes of
167. See notes 177-88 and accompanying text infra.
168. See Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843) (deriving the English rule from
the maxim, from which in turn all common-law ground-water rights have evolved).
169. 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974).
170. Id.; see notes 152-56 and accompanying text supra.
171. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392,411,319 A.2d 871,881(1974).
172. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528(1855); seenotes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
173. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392,412,319 A.2d 871,882(1974).
174. Id.
pollution interferences. The state may enjoin such actions under the
statutory or common-law principles governing abatement of public
nuisances. 
75
The law of private nusiance is left unclear. It appears, however, that
individuals may bring an action in private nuisance for activities resulting
in pollution of percolating waters if they can show some special injury
either greater or different than the injury suffered by the general public. 1
76
D. Comparisons and Conclusions
Pennsylvania's ground-water law rests on a plethora of distinctions,
doctrines, and legal fictions. Table 1 schematically summarizes the major
discernible classifications of interference problems and applicable liability
rules. As can be-seen from Table 1, simplicity, predictability and consist-
ency are not prime characteristics of the common-law approach to ground-
water use.
175. Id. at 408-12, 319 A.2d at 880-82.
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A crucial element of Pennsylvania's common law of ground water
was the distinction between "natural" and "non-natural" activities. This
distinction, no longer applicable in pollution litigation as a result of Barnes
& Tucker, 177 still pervades the law of ground-water allocation and applies
in conflicts between competing uses. Unfortunately, the distinction results
in a rule without rationale, favoring certain kinds of "natural" uses. But
what uses are natural? The cases clearly treat mine dewatering' 78 and
domestic water supply uses 17 9 as natural, while off-land uses are not
natural. 18 0 The best definition of a natural use is one which a landowner
cannot avoid in the development of his land. 181 Is irrigation or industrial
on-land use then natural? The supreme court has decreed that a pipeline for
oil is a non-natural use while mining is a natural use. 182 This distinction,
based on the principle that the pipeline could have been located elsewhere
while the coal cannot be moved, is vague at best. Short of a judicial
determination of the naturalness or non-naturalness of each use, the rule is
unworkable. Moreover, the arbitrary selection of "natural" activities and
prohibition of ground-water diversion off the land of withdrawal favors
particular, often inefficient, uses of water.
The present status of the dichotomy of "natural" and "non-natural"
uses established in Wheatley and Sanderson must be carefully analyzed.
The court in Barnes & Tucker points out that Sanderson had been
consistently distinguished and limited to its facts. 183 One of the key means
by which Sanderson was contained was the natural/non-natural dis-
tinction. 
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The rationale behind the Sanderson decision is identical to that of
cases dealing with other mining interferences and competing uses of
177. 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974).
178. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); DiGiacinto v. New Jersey Zinc Co.,
27 Leh. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
179. Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
180. See notes 102-06 and accompanying text supra.
181. See, e.g., Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (the injuries complained of
were natural and necessary results of the development by the owner of his land).
182. Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893).
183. See Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 411, 319 A.2d 871, 881
(1974); McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 A. 1102 (1913).
The changed conditions brought about by the appellee have not resulted from
the development and natural use and enjoyment of its own property, as was the
situation in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, the doctrine of which
case has never been and never ought to be extended beyond the limitations put upon
it by its own facts. There it was said of the coal company: "They have brought
nothing on to the land artificially. The water as it is poured into Meadow Brook, is
the water which the mine naturally discharges, its impurity arises from natural, not
artificial causes. The mine cannot, of course, be operated elsewhere than where the
coal is naturally found, and the discharge is a necessary incident to the mining of it."
Here the furnaces were artificially brought by appellee on to its lands by being built
there by it, and the "Mesaba" ore converted by the furnaces into iron is also
artificially brought there by it.
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 549, 57 A. 1065, 1068-69 (1904).
184. See Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 304 Pa. 583, 156 A. 240 (1931); McCune v.
Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 A. 1102 (1913).
ground water. 185 Rejection of the Sanderson rationale appears to indicate a
rejection of the "ad coelum" maxim upon which all of these cases are
predicated. Barnes & Tucker is clearly an acceptance of the maxim "use
your property so as not to injure others." If the rationale of Sanderson is
"no longer viable" in pollution cases, then clearly the same rationale is no
longer viable with respect to other ground-water interferences. There is no
logical reason for imposing liability for polluting a neighbor's water supply
and not imposing liability for dewatering a neighbor's supply. Either a
landowner has the absolute right to use his land in a natural manner without
fear of incurring liability, or he is without that absolute right.
Pennsylvania decisions reflect a discrepancy which may be clarified
by future judicial action. The cases dealing with competing use (including
dewatering caused by mine pumping) are currently governed by the
doctrine of non-liability for natural use of the land, or the American rule.
Pollution interferences are governed by the law of nuisance. Although
cases like Barnes & Tucker, 8 6 Rothrauff,I1 7 and Landsdale Municipal
Authority188 indicate a trend toward liberalization of the old doctrines, the
law is presently fragmented, inconsistent, and difficult to predict.
IV. State, Regional, and Local Regulation of Ground-Water Use in
Pennsylvania
Although common-law approaches to ground-water use and alloca-
tion continue to provide the primary legal foundation for resolving con-
flicts among competing users, the impact of statutory and regulatory
enactments has been increasingly felt in recent years.
A. State Regulation
No regulatory or statutory program comprehensively addresses the
allocation of ground water among competing users or provides for long-
term management of ground-water resources in Pennsylvania. Surface-
and ground-water allocation and management have been left to the com-
mon law. A few state laws attempt to regulate and impose permit
requirements on specified sources and particular uses. For example, the
185. See, e.g., Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940);
Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514 (1863); Wheatley v.
Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855).
In Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143,159, 18 A. 1012, 1013 (1890), the court
stated:
The principle of Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson is precisely the same as that of
Wheatley v. Baugh, and is of general application. It is, that the use which inflicts the
damage must be natural, proper, and free from negligence, and the damage unavoid-
able. On the question of negligence, the question of knowledge is always important,
and may be conclusive. Hence the practical inquiry is, first, whether the damage was
necessary and unavoidable; secondly, if not, was it sufficiently obvious to have been
foreseen, and also preventable by reasonable care and expenditure?
186. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455 Pa. 392, 319 A.2d 871 (1974).
187. Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940).
188. Hatfield Twp. v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (C.P. Montg. 1959).
1939 Water Rights Act'8 9 and the 1923 Limited Water Power and Water
Supply Law' 90 attempt to bring diversions by public water companies,
municipalities, and power projects under a system of administrative review
and regulation. 191 These laws have been confined to surface waters used by
such entities; diversion of ground waters is outside their scope. Two
statutes do focus on ground-water aspects of water resource management:
the Water Well Drillers License Act 192 and the Clean Streams Law. 193
The Water Well Drillers License Act' 94 recognizes ground water as a
"renewable natural resource" requiring "orderly and reasonable" de-
velopment "without waste, in order to assure sufficient supplies for
continued population growth and industrial development . . . ,"'95 but
the primary focus of the act is information collection rather than regulation
of water use. The requirement that well drillers obtain a license' 96 is only a
registration scheme. The qualifications and operations of drillers are
neither reviewed nor regulated. The act does not control the location or
method of drilling; its sole purpose is to collect ground-water information
through mandatory recording and filing of well location, penetrated strata,
design, and yield data. 1
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The collection of accurate ground-water information is essential in
predicting and planning the future orderly development of the Common-
wealth's water resources and is fundamental to establishing a more rational
water allocation law. Unfortunately, as a method for procuring and
disseminating this data, the Drillers Act has not proven reliable. From 1970
to 1974 an average of 6,000 water well completion reports per year were
filed with the state. While this represents a mass of information (of varying
accuracy), it constitutes only a small part of the true ground-water picture.
189. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 842, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 631-41 (1967).
190. Act of June 14, 1923, P.L. 704, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 591-600
(1967). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 681-91 (1967) (the Water Obstructions Act,
regulating placement of obstructions in, and changes in the course, current, or cross-section
of, surface waters); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 621-25 (1967) (granting eminent domain powers
to holders of limited water power or water supply permits).
191. It should be noted that some provisions of the Limited Water Power and Water
Supply Act have never become effective. The Act tied state regulation of diversions for
thermal-electric plants to Federal Power Commission licensing requirements. Because FPC
jurisdiction has not been extended to regulate thermal-electric plant diversions (cooling
water), the corresponding provisions of the state act are not operational. Letter Opinion from
Robert E. Woodside, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, to Hon. S.S. Lewis, Secretary of
Forests and Waters, March 26, 1953; Pa. Dept. of Environmental Resources General
Counsel's Opinion, Control Over Consumptive Uses of Water in Power Projects (May 7,
1974), at pp. 2-9.
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 645.1-.13 (1967 and Supp. 1976).
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (1964 and Supp. 1976).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 645.1-.13 (1967 and Supp. 1976).
195. Id. § 645.1.
196. Id. § 645.4. The license is obtainable from the Topographic and Geologic Survey.
Pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 510-24 (Supp. 1976), the Topographic and Geologic
Survey was transferred from the State Planning Board to the Department of Environmental
Resources.
197. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32. § 645.10 (1967); 25 PA. CODE § 107.7 (April 30, 1976).
In 1974, for example, the Bureau of Topographic and Geologic Survey
discovered that 154 licensed drillers (27%) had failed to report on some or
all of the wells they had drilled in the previous year. The number of
unreported wells exceeded 10,500, or 175% of the total reported.198 It is
apparent that the Water Well Drillers License Act, while providing a
mechanism for collecting ground-water data, has hardly lived up to its goal
of encouraging orderly development of ground-water resources or
stimulating close cooperation in procuring the detailed information needed
by state officials and the general public.
In contrast to the Drillers Act, the Clean Streams Law' 99 is primarily a
regulatory act intended to control and prevent pollution of state waters.
Springs and underground waters are explicitly within its protection. 200
Discharges of sewage20 1 or industrial waste 202 are prohibited unless
authorized by permit and conducted in accordance with regulations
adopted by the Environmental Quality Board. The Board is empowered to
require permits for other activities that threaten to pollute waters of the
Commonwealth.203
Although the Board has established detailed surface water quality
criteria 20 4 and treatment requirements for varying effluent-producing
activities, 20 5 it has taken relatively few regulatory steps with respect to
ground-water pollution. Discharge of wastes, including storm water
runoff, into wells, mines, and underground horizons is treated in only the
most general fashion in Department of Environmental Resources regula-
tions .206 Although Pennsylvania has been cited as maintaining one of the
most advanced ground-water pollution control programs (aimed primarily
at emergency problems) ,207 sophisticated regulatory, monitoring and
enforcement programs to protect ground waters from contamination are
only in the developmental stages.
208
Despite the comparatively rudimentary state of Pennsylvania's ground-
water pollution program, the Clean Streams Law209 provides several
important statutory guideposts in the water law field. It recognizes subter-
ranean water, as well as surface streams and lakes, as waters of the
Commonwealth deserving state protection and regulation. 210 Moreover,
198. Interview with Arthur A. Socolow, supra note 4.
199. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (1967 and Supp. 1976).
200. Id. § 691.1 (definition of "waters of the Commonwealth").
201. Id. § 691.201-.202.
202. Id. § 691.301, 691.307.
203. Id. § 691.402.
204. 25 PA. CODE §§ 93.1-.6.
205. Id. § 97.1-.86.
206. See id. 99 97.71-.75.
207. GERAGHTY & MILLER, INC., GROUND-WATER PROTECTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, A
MODEL STATE PROGRAM (1974).
208. Interview with Carlyle W. Westlund, Chief, Ground-Water Geology Section, Bur.
of Water Quality Mgt., Pa. Dept. of Environ. Res., July 27, 1976.
209. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1976).
210. See id. § 691.1 (definition of "waters of the Commonwealth").
the act identifies the need to protect a broad range of surface- and
ground-water applications, including domestic, municipal, industrial,
commercial, agricultural, recreational, aquatic and wildlife uses. 211 The
most valuable precedent of the Clean Streams Law is its acknowledgment
that all water-on or under the ground, in natural or artificial bodies-is
part of a single, interdependent system requiring comprehensive consider-
ation and coordinated protection. This lesson applies to all elements of
water management law.
B. Interstate Commission Controls
The Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions (DRBC
and SRBC), established by interstate compacts 21 2 to provide comprehen-
sive planning and regulation of water resources, play an increasingly
important role in managing the ground waters of the eastern two-thirds of
Pennsylvania. 213
1. Project Review Powers.-Pursuant to their project review
authority, both commissions require approval of proposed ground-water
activities that may have a "substantial effect" on basin waters2 14 to assure
consistency with commission-adopted comprehensive plans2 15 and "the
proper conservation, development, management, or control of the water
resources of the basin .... ,"216 In the Delaware Basin, significant
projects are defined as those with average gross ground-water withdrawals
exceeding 100,000 gallons per day during any calendar month.217 SRBC
rules effective June 1, 1975, require approval for ground- and surface-
water allocations involving "a commitment of water to a specific use for a
period of time longer than ten years," ' 2 18 with an exclusion for ground-
water withdrawals of less than 100,000 gallons per day by a single user. 
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211. Id. §§ 691.1 (definition of "pollution"), 691.4 (declaration of policy).
212. Delaware River Basin Compact, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 815.101 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as DRBC Compact]; Susquehanna River Basin Compact, id. §§ 820.1-.8 (Supp. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as SRBC Compact]. The legislation ratifying the DRBC Company includes
Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6501-11
(1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1ID-1 to -110 (1963); N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
LAW §§ 21-0701 to -0723 (McKinney 1973). Legislation approving the SRBC Compact
includes Act of Dec. 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509; MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §
8-301 (1974); and N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW §§ 21-1301 to -1321 (McKinney
1973).
213. For a general discussion of DRBC and SRBC activities relating to surface waters,
see Weston and Gray, supra note 9, at 389-95.
214. DRBC Compact § 3.8; SRBC Compact § 3.10(2). The SRBC Compact requires
approval for any project (1) on or crossing the boundary of member states; (2) involving
diversion of water; (3) having a significant effect on water resources in another state; or (4)
which has been included in the comprehensive plan or would significantly effect the plan.
SRBC Compact § 3.10(2).
215. DRBC Compact § 3.8; SRBC Compact § 3.10(4).
216. SRBC Compact § 3.10(4).
217. 18 C.F.R. §§ 401.32, 401.35(2) (1976).
218. Id. § 803.3(a)(5).
219. Id. § 803.3(a)(5)(i)(b).
Except for environmental impact statement requirements 220 imposed
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act,22 ' only general criteria
for ground-water management have been adopted by the DRBC. 222 The
SRBC's regulations are far more detailed than those of DRBC in regard to
the contents of permit applications. All water projects are required to
address a specified set of economic, environmental, engineering and
hydrologic issues. 223 Among these are ground-water characteristics such
as quality, existing water tables, ground-water flow, safe yield, and natural
recharge. 224 Nevertheless, SRBC has not yet adopted specific standards for
approving proposed ground-water uses.
Despite the commissions' broad potential powers over ground-water
withdrawals, the project review provisions have had only limited impact.
In the past five years DRBC has reviewed fewer than seventy large
wells, 225 although over 1500 wells were drilled in the five-county Philadel-
phia area in 1975 alone. 226 It is estimated that DRBC's reviews have
covered in quantity only ten to twenty percent of Pennsylvania's Delaware
River Basin ground-water use. 22 7 Limited funds and staff have confined
the commissions' involvement to only the very largest withdrawals.
Moreover, since neither SRBC nor DRBC have field staff to monitor
compliance with project approval requirements and there'is no state
ground-water program to provide inspection services for the commissions,
only limited success has been achieved in regulating the location and
operation of industrial and agricultural wells subject to commission
rules. 228 Hence, the SRBC and DRBC project review programs address
only a small fraction of ground-water use in Pennsylvania, 229 and cannot
yet be classified as truly comprehensive ground-water management
systems.
2. "Protected Area" and Emergency Powers.-In addition to
"project review" powers, the commissions are authorized to "regulate
and control withdrawals and diversions from surface waters and ground
waters" within designated protected areas or under emergency condi-
220. Id. § 401.52.
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1971).
222. DRBC, WATER MANAGEMENT OF THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN A-9 to A-10 (1975),
codifying DRBC Comprehensive Plan § 2.2, at 11-11 (1972); DRBC Resolution 64-8 (July 22,
1964); DRBC Resolution 64-1i (Sept. 23, 1964).
223. 18 C.F.R. § 803.23 (1976).
224. Id. § 803.23(c)(vii)(b).
225. Interview with David Everett, Chief, Project Review Branch, Delaware River
Basin Commission, March 22, 1976.
226. BUR. OF ToPoG. & GEOL. SURVEY, PA. DEPT. OF ENVIRON. RES., 1975 WATER WELL
COMPLETION REPORTS FOR BUCKS, MONTGOMERY, DELAWARE, CHESTER AND PHILADELPHIA
COUNTIES.
227. Interview with Arthur A. Socolow, supra note 4.
228. Interview with David Everett, supra note 225.
229. Even on the basis of water quantity used, the DRBC's and SRBC's limited
regulation of wells over 100,000 gallons per day is estimated to cover only ten to twenty
percent of the total ground water withdrawals in the basins. Interview with Arthur A.
Socolow, supra note 4.
tions. 230 When, for example, ground-water withdrawals in an area "have
developed or threaten to develop to such a degree as to create a water
shortage or to impair or conflict with the requirements or effectuation" of
the basin comprehensive plans,23' the commissions may declare a "pro-
tected area" within which water diversions are prohibited unless
authorized by a commission permit or a state permit issued prior to the
effective date of the basin compact.232 In the event of drought or other
condition that may cause actual and immediate water shortage, DRBC and
SRBC may declare a water supply emergency in all or part of their
respective basins, 233 thereby activating special regulatory systems that
temporarily supersede state and regular basin water allocation pro-
grams. 234 To date, neither commission has invoked its "protected area" or
"emergency" powers to regulate ground-water use, although the Dela-
ware commission has exercised its emergency authority to control surface
withdrawals during the 1965-67 drought .235 Implementation of a ground-
water conservation program did not prove necessary in 1965-67, but both
DRBC and SRBC are empowered to do so in a declared emergency.
C. Local Regulation
In Pennsylvania only the Borough Code specifically authorizes
municipal regulation of water wells and ground-water use, 236 but all local
governments have the power to adopt ordinances and regulations deemed
necessary for the peace, health, safety and welfare of the municipality. 237
Several Pennsylvania communities have used these powers to adopt
ordinances regulating water wells for one or more purposes.
Warwick Township in Bucks County, for example, enacted a detailed
drilling ordinance 238 focusing on the design and operation of wells to
prevent contamination of well waters or ground-water aquifiers by pollut-
ants. The Bucks County townships of Warrington,2 39 Buckingham 24° and
230. DRBC Compact §§ 10.1-10.8; SRBC Compact §§ 11.1-11.8.
231. DRBC Compact § 10.2; SRBC Compact § 11.2.
232. DRBC Compact § 10.3; SRBC Compact § 11.3.
233. DRBC Compact § 10.4; SRBC Compact § 11.4.
234. DRBC Compact §§ 10.4-.5, 10.8; SRBC Compact §§ 11.4-.5, 11.8.
235. DRBC Emergency Resolution No. 1, Res. 65-13 (July 7, 1965). This resolution was
adopted during the drought experienced in the middle sixties to conserve river flows. An
effect of this resolution was the prevention of salt water intrusion into underground aquifers
serving Camden, New Jersey, as well as the surface water supplies of Philadelphia. For a
detailed analysis of the background and resolution of the Delaware Basin drought, see R.
HOGARTY, THE DELAWARE RIVER DROUGHT EMERGENCY (Inter-University Case Program No.
107, 1970).
236. Borough Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46202(39) (1966).
237. Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, 351 PA. CODE §§ 1.1-100 (Mar. 31, 1974); Second
Class City Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 23145, 23158 (1957 and Supp. 1975); Third Class
City Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 37403(60) (1957); Borough Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §
46202(74) (1966); First Class Township Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 56552 (1957); Second
Class Township Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 65762 (Supp. 1975).
238. Warwick Twp., Pa., Ordinance No. 33, Sept. 4, 1973.
239. Warrington Twp., Pa., Ordinance No. 3-61, June 5, 1961; Rules & Regulations
Governing the Construction and Operation of Public, Semi-Public, and Private Water Supply
Wells Under Ordinance No. 3-61 of Warrington Twp. (undated).
240. Buckingham Twp., Pa., Ordinance No. 6-74, August 1, 1974.
Horsham24" ' have also addressed the water withdrawal conflicts in ground-
water use through drilling ordinances and regulations. Horsham's ordi-
nance, adopted in 1954, for example, requires a permit for all well drilling
in the township.242 If the total capacity of existing and proposed wells
operated by an applicant exceeds 10,000 gallons per day, or close spacing
of wells exists in an area, the administering authority may impose condi-
tions on permits to protect the applicant and the public, and may issue
limited or revocable permits.24 3 Disposal of industrial or domestic waste in
wells is specifically prohibited.2 44
V. A Critical Assessment of Present Pennsylvania Ground-Water Law
With 15 to 30 thousand new wells drilled annually and with burgeon-
ing water use in rural and suburban areas primarily reliant on ground water,
Pennsylvania faces a major challenge. If its water resources are to be
developed and managed in the long-term public interest, it must critically
assess and, when necessary, reform the melee of rules, doctrines and
theories that have thus far governed ground-water allocation and use.
Commentators have identified a series of useful factors for analyzing
the merits of water rights schemes, doctrines and rules. 245 Generally, these
can be posed in terms of several questions.
A. Does the Legal System Correspond to Hydrologic Fact?
1. The Distinction Between Ground and Surface Water.-All
ground-water geologists, hydrogeologists, hydrologists, geochemists and
soil scientists agree that ground and surface waters are not distinct systems
acting independently, but are highly interrelated and interact in one large
system. 24' Rivers and lakes are connected to and are part of the ground-
water table or saturated zone. Ground water discharges to the surface as
springs, swamps, and natural lakes; it also seeps directly into stream
channels, thereby supplying the base flow of Pennsylvania watercourses.
During times of surface stream flooding, the gradient between the surface
241. Horsham Twp., Pa., Ordinance No. 28, Nov. 16, 1954.
242. Id. § 4.
243. Id. § 6.
244. Id. § 7. The Warrington and Buckingham programs are essentially the same as the
Horsham model, although Buckingham excepts wells with less than a capacity of 1000gallons
per day from permit requirements. Sources cited notes 239, 240 supra.
245. E. CLYDE & D. JENSEN, ADMINISTRATIVE ALLOCATION OF WATER (Nat'l Water
Comm'n Legal Study 3, NWC-L-71-025, 1971); C. CORKER & J. CROSBY, GROUNDWATER
LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal Study 6, NWC-L-72-
026, 1971) [hereinafter cited as CORKER]; P. DOMENICO, CONCEPTS AND MODELS IN GROUND-
WATER HYDROLOGY 78 (1972); L. MACK, GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENTOFA
NATIONAL POLICY ON WATER (Nat'l Water Comm'n Rep. No. NWC-EES-71-004, 1971);
NATIONAL WATER WELL ASS'N, A MANUAL OF LAWS, REGULATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR
CONTROL OF GROUND WATER POLLUTION (working draft, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
N.W.W.A. MANUAL]; I WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, §§ 60-63; Hanks & Hanks,
supra note 14.
246. S. DAVIS & R. DEWEIST, HYDROGEOLOGY 15-70 (1966); N.W.W.A. MANUAL, supra
note 245, at I-1 to 1-33.
stream and water table may be reversed and streams may discharge into
ground water. 247
Large ground-water withdrawals will result in surface water disturb-
ances. Although such interferences have not yet resulted in litigation in the
Commonwealth, instances of their occurrence have been documented. 248
There are many ground-water uses that can induce a flow of surface waters
into the ground. In the normal situation, however, ground water flows into
surface bodies of water. Increasing ground-water use will exert a continu-
ing effect upon surface waters, and surface-water uses will affect ground
waters. Separate sets of rules governing the use of surface and ground
waters will be inadequate for resolution of conflicts resulting from their
interdependency.
Current Pennsylvania common-law doctrines and basin commission
permit programs treat surface and ground waters under separate and
distinct rules. Often these rules are in direct conflict. A simple hypothetical
situation illustrates this. A landowner pumping his well causes loss of
water from a nearby stream. Since the well owner does not own land next to
the stream, he has no right to withdraw stream water under the riparian
surface-water rules. The Wheatley rule of percolating ground waters,
however, would allow the well owner to take as much water as he can apply
in the natural use of his land .249 The court would be forced to choose
between the two rules.250 It is obvious that the present rules are incapable of
resolving these conflicts, for they divide the hydrologic system into
arbitrarily distinguished entities.
When courts have been forced to face obvious surface- and ground-
water interrelationships they have recognized the unworkability of arbit-
rary dichotomies, but their solutions have not always been far-sighted or
equitable. For example, New York courts have extended surface-water
reasonable use rules in cases of conflict between surface- and ground-water
uses and ruled that no one may interfere with surface waters or percolating
ground waters that supply streams. 25 1 The result is that ground-water uses
247. The quantity of water supplied to streams from the ground has been the subject of
extensive studies in several Pennsylvania river basins. See J. BIESECKER, J. LESCINSKY & C.
WOOD, WATER RESOURCESOFTHE SCHUYLKILL RIVER BASIN (Pa. Water Resources Bull. No. 3
1968); 0. LLOYD & D. GROwITz, GROUND-WATER RESOURCES OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN
YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 32 (U.S. Geological Survey Open File Report, 1972); F.
OLMSTED & A. HELY, RELATION BETWEEN GROUND WATER AND SURFACE WATER IN BRANDY-
WINE CREEK BASIN, PENNSYLVANIA A-8 (U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 417-A,
1962); C. WOOD, H. FLIPPO, J. LESCINSKY & J. BARKER, WATER RESOURCES OF LEHIGH
COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 42 (U.S. Geological Survey Water Resources Rpt. 31, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as WOOD].
248. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 247, at 130-54; Minutes, Water Law and Legisi.
Subcomm. of the Pa. Water Resources Coord. Comm., Dec. 12, 1973 (dewatering of stream
by State College Borough wells).
249. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); see notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
250. See, e.g., Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522,58 N.E. 644 (1900); Smith v.
City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899); Stevens v. Spring Valley Water Works &
Supply Co., 42 Misc. 2d 86, 247 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1964).
251. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Smith v. City of
Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899).
might be prohibited while surface-water uses would be maintained at 100
percent. Such a rule favors certain kinds of property interests over others,
may promote inefficient uses, and does not allocate the water on a rational
basis. This approach, like so many other sub-rules of the American
ground-water doctrine, is a piecemeal solution to immediate problems
between two landowners. The courts have not yet been forced to develop a
body of law capable of governing the whole resource. Rules such as this,
which do not treat the hydrologic system as a single physical unit and
cannot deal with the system's responses to stresses and the effects of those
stresses on other property rights, will be useless when faced with complex
problems of conflicting needs and multiple uses.
2. The Distinction Between Subterranean Streams and Percolating
Ground Waters.-Not only are ground and surface waters falsely consi-
dered distinct, but the current law speciously creates categories of "under-
ground streams" and "percolating ground waters. "252 As noted earlier in
this article,253 the distinction between subterranean streams and percolat-
ing ground waters was originally based on the rationale that the former,
when visible, were predictable, while the latter were nearly always
unpredictable. Under the law of Pennsylvania, ground water is classified as
a subterranean stream and governed by the law of surface waters if it has a
defined channel presumably large enough to be visible upon excavation.
There is, however, no indication whether such channels are restricted to
voids or include areas filled with porous water-transmitting rocks. Faults
and fracture zones often conduct large volumes of water and are frequently
well defined, but it is unclear whether the courts would consider them to be
subterranean streams.
As a matter of geology, the legal distinction is virtually meaningless.
All ground water is located in open spaces within rock materials. The water
transmitting ability of the earth depends on the number, size, and shape of
these open spaces.254 The distinction between underground streams and
percolating ground waters cannot be based on size, since there is a
continuum of size ranging from a few microns to a few feet without logical
break 255 Nor can the distinction be based on predictability of flow
directions or of responses to withdrawal of water, since percolating waters
in a homogenous aquifer are much more susceptible to accurate prediction
than are waters in complex fractured and cavernous aquifers. 256 Yet it is the
latter, now relatively unpredictable, aquifers that first earned the name
"underground streams."
252. See notes 38-55 and accompanying text supra.
253. Id.
254. THOMAS, Underground Sources of Our Water, in USDA, THE YEARBOOK OF
AGRICULTURE-1955, H.R. Doc. No. 32, 84th Cong., Ist Sess., 63-74, (1955) reprinted inC.
MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 553, 556 (1971).
255. S. DAVIS & R. DEWEIST, supra note 246, at 156-260.
256. A. BECHER, supra note 1, at 16.
The usefulness of this distinction has been destroyed. It is today
realized that even the rare caverns first dubbed underground streams are fed
by water from a broad range of differently sized fracture and pore spaces. If
a cavern is a subterranean stream, then where does it cease to be one and
where do the percolating ground waters start? The distinction is based on a
scientific demonstration that never existed.
As the amount of technical knowledge in the hydrogeologic field has
grown, the sophistication of the normal users has also expanded. Concepts
of ground-water movement are becoming more widely understood. With
increased knowledge and ability to predict, understand, and, hence,
regulate ground-water regimes, ground-water law may now move away
from the arbitrary distinctions of the past and concentrate on the more
important issue of resource allocation. But to accomplish that task the law
must recognize and conform to the basic hydrologic and geologic facts. If
the legal system is divorced from the actual mechanisms of water recharge,
discharge, quantity and motion, it will be incapable of facing the challenge
of apportioning water resources when water rights conflict.
B. How Well Is the Relative Availability or Scarcity of the Resource
Addressed?
Pennsylvania is increasingly reliant upon direct ground-water with-
drawal for its water needs. Between 1960 and 1966 direct withdrawals of
ground water for all uses increased thirty-five percent while surface water
withdrawal grew only ten percent. 257 Projections indicate that by 1990
consumptive uses of water will double. 258 There is every reason to believe
that ground water will provide an ever increasing part of this demand,
especially in areas where surface waters are already over-allocated and
further reservoir construction is difficult or controversial. Even where use
of surface sources predominates, approximately seventy percent of the
total water used is directly or indirectly supplied by ground water.
259
Ground waters are the major source of our water supply, but it is
unclear how much of this partially replenishable supply has already been
exhausted. In some watersheds withdrawals do not, or only barely, exceed
recharge. As a result there will be no appreciable lowering of the water
table and no effect on surface streams. When and if withdrawals exceed
recharge, water will be taken from storage in the aquifer. This is often
referred to as "mining" the acquifer and results in lowering the water table.
Recent studies show that "mining" conditions are already extant in rapidly
257. Bur. of Resources Programming, Pa. Dept. of Environ. Res., Pennsylvania Con-
solidated Water Use Report-State Totals, Oct. 16, 1975 (computer printout on file at D.E.R.)
[hereinafter cited as Pa. Water Use].
258. 0. LLOYD & D. GRowrrz, supra note 247, at 32.
259. P. DOMENICO, supra note 245, at 79-80; N.W.W.A. MANUAL, supra note 245, at
1-36, 1-37.
developing portions of Bucks, Montgomery and Chester counties. 260 As
ground-water use increases, it is inevitable that more areas will experience
excessive withdrawals and conflicts among competing uses will
increase.
261
The American rule, as followed in Pennsylvania, was not designed to
deal with shortage conflicts. It was developed to govern use of a resource
that appeared to be limitless. As Pennsylvania approaches an era when
water becomes increasingly short in supply, the rule that any landowner
may take as much water as he needs in the natural use of his land regardless
of the result to his neighbor will be a useless tool in assuring either the
maximum beneficial use of a scarce resource or the equitable distribution
of a resource necessary for the support of all life.
C. Is the System Capable of Managing Ground Water as a Replenish-
able Resource?
Ground water in Pennsylvania is, with few exceptions, a replenish-
able resource. The great volumes of water in the ground far exceed the
annual recharge by precipitation and discharge into streams. 262 This water
is said to be in "storage." Large withdrawals in excess of input, however,
may result in large decreases in the water table and in a matter of years can
remove what nature took centuries to accumulate. 263 Such dewatering may
result in land subsidence 264 or allow infiltration of sea water or other
non-potable water into the ground-water basin.
265
Hydrologic aquifer management is, therefore, essential to the protec-
tion of ground-water resources. Since most useful Pennsylvania aquifers
receive substantial recharge, 266 the issue for the Commonwealth is how to
manage this resource so that it may provide sustained benefits both now
260. See Chester-Betz Engineers, Areas of Ground-Water Overpumping, Plate IV-16, in
COWAMP STUDY AREA No. 1, ch. 4, draft (Delaware Valley Regional Planning Comm'n
1976).
261. See Citizens Utility Home Water Co. Well No. 4, DRBC Dkt. No. D-73-14CP
(1973). Project approval was reopened in October, 1976, on complaints of increasing
conflicts. N.W.W.A. MANUAL, supra note 245, at 1-9.
262. A. BECHER, supra note i, at 14. Total precipitation in Pennsylvania is 32 trillion
gallons per year. Twenty-one trillion gallons is carried to the sea directly by streams.
Approximately 10 trillion gallons of the stream flow is provided by ground water discharge. A
large part of the remaining precipitation is returned to the atmosphere by evapotranspiration.
Only about one-third of the annual rainfall, 10 trillion gallons, reaches the ground water. A
conservative estimate of total Pennsylvania ground water storage is 47 trillion gallons. Thus
storage is approximately five times the annual infiltration. Id.
263. See S. DAVIS& R. DEWEIST, supra note 246, at 45; Bagley, Water Rights Law and
Public Policies Relating to Ground Water "Mining" in the Southwestern States, 4 J. LAW &
ECON. 144 (1961).
264. S. DAVIS & R. DEWEIST, supra note 246, at 397-400; N.W.W.A. MANUAL, supra
note 245, at 1-37.
265. S. DAVIS & R. DEWEIST, supra note 246, at 237-41.
266. A. BECHER, supra note 1, at 15; Interview with Alan Geyer, Chief, Environ. Div.,
Bur. of Topog. & Geol. Survey, Pa. Dept. of Environ. Res., March 15, 1976.
and for future generations. "A decision to limit ground-water use to long
term recharge is rational and can be defended.' '267
As discussed previously, present Pennsylvania water doctrines reflect
no understanding of the hydrologic cycle. Separate rules for streams and
ground waters are incompatible with governing the ground water as a
replenishable resource. Current Pennsylvania law does not recognize a
concept of "safe yield" of ground-water aquifers. Each landowner is
allowed to take all the water he desires unless malicious or negligent harm
to others results. 2 68 Such withdrawals may effectively "mine" the aquifer,
taking more than long-term recharge, even to the extent of permanently
damaging the aquifer strata and foreclosing use by future generations.
D. How Does the Legal System Define Allowable Uses?
Every scheme of water law must define lawful and unlawful uses of
water. Definition may be made in terms of the type of user, the kind of use,
the quantity of use, or the place of use. Whichever method or combination
is used, the definition of allowable uses should meet certain criteria. The
definitions and their application should be predictable and unambiguous,
should avoid arbitrary distinctions between similar uses, and should be
designed to allocate a resource among various users through a system of
priorities, or at least a mechanism for creating priorities in situations of
conflict. The legal definitions of allowable uses should focus on (1) the
relative economic and social need for each use, (2) the effect of each use on
ground water, and (3) the ability of each use to fulfill its needs by other
means in times of scarcity.
269
267. CORKER, supra note 245, at 173; see A. BECHER, supra note I, at 34-35. See generally
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 980, 207 P.2d 17 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 9-2915 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 45, § 537 (1974); WASH. REV CODE tit. 90, §
90.44.130 (1962); COMM. ON GROUND WATER OF THE IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DIV., AM.
SOC'Y OF Civ. ENGINEERS, GROUND-WATER BASIN MANAGEMENT 52-53 (1960); P. DOMENICO,
supra note 245, at 79-80.
One author concludes, however:
"Mining" should always be permitted if groundwater has no significant recharge.
Otherwise, the water in a basin without recharge will never be useful. . . .The only
concern of the law should be to provide proper and continued warning to all those
who may become dependent on the resource that it has a finite life, and to fix the
period over which the resource will be consumed.
CORKER, supra note 245, at 172. For an example of such a management scheme for a
non-recharging basin, see Harris, Water Allocation under the Appropriation Doctrine in the
Lea County Underground Basin of New Mexico, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE
EASTERN UNITED STATES 155 (Haber & Bergen eds. 1958); CORKER, supra note 245, at 175-76.
It should further be noted that recharge, as well as ground water use, is a variable in a
long-term management scheme. Increased agricultural uses, drawn from surface sources,
may supplement precipitation in recharging a particular aquifer. More important, continued
development and installation of impervious surfaces over land will inevitably increase runoff
and decrease the amount of water percolating to the water table. A management scheme
aimed at conserving ground water on the basis of its "safe yield" must not only limit
withdrawals, but also protect the vital recharge of important aquifers.
268. Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); see notes 88-110 and accompanying text
supra.
269. E. CLYDE AND D. JENSEN, supra note 245, at 57-59.
Under present Pennsylvania law, all uses of ground water on the land
from which it is extracted are allowable. 270 Uses on other lands are
unlawful if they interfere with any other owner's use of the same ground-
water source. 271 Those without land cannot take any ground water, and
those whose land is unsuitable for development cannot use the water under
their land. These distinctions are irrational and capricious from the
perspective of water use or ground-water effects. Why, for example,
should withdrawals of water for a factory located on the same parcel as the
well be treated differently than transfers of identical amounts to a factory
500 feet away but on another lot?
Pennsylvania cases have also suggested a distinction favoring "ordi-
nary or natural" uses of water. 272 The limits of this distinction and the
classification of uses as ordinary or extraordinary, 273 natural or
unnatural, 274 have never been elucidated. Such uncertain and confused
categories give water users and land investors little guidance in the
planning and execution of their activities. If a water law is to be self-
executing and administrable, the definitions of allowable use must be
clear, or the system will result in endless litigation over semantics.
E. Does the System Control Consumptive Use?
If Pennsylvania chooses to manage its water resources for long-term
conservation and productivity, it is essential that consumptive uses be
controlled. Consumptive uses are those that do not return all or part of the
water to the ground or surface supply. Many of man's industrial and
agricultural activities result in major water losses through evaporation and
transpiration processes .275 By the year 1990, consumptive losses caused by
man's activities are projected to double, totalling almost fifteen billion
gallons a day. 276
In addition to such losses, transfers of water from one basin or
watershed to another effectively act as consumptive losses for the
watershed of origin and can have a dramatic effect on some basins. 277 The
problem with increased evapotranspiration losses or interbasin transfers is
that they effectively remove water from both the surface- and ground-water
resources of an area. Re-use is impossible until the water is returned by
270. See notes 88-101 and accompanying text supra.
271. See notes 102-10 and accompanying text supra.
272. See notes 95-110, 150-75 and accompanying text supra.
273. See Weston & Gray, supra note 9, at 365-69.
274. See notes 177-88 and accompanying text supra.
275. For an extensive discussion of one such consumptive use in power plants, see
Weston & Gray, supra note 9, at 365-76, 383-84.
276. Pa. Water Use, supra note 257.
277. For example, it is projected that by 1990, interbasin transfers will remove 117
million gallons per day (MGD) from the Allegheny River. This, plus the 176 MGD of
consumptive losses on the river will equal almost 16 percent of the Allegheny's low flow even
augmented by the Kinzua dam. Pa. Water Use, supra note 257; Interview with Gene
Armocida, Chief, Hydrology Branch; Pittsburgh Dist., United States Army Corps of
Engineers, March 22, 1976.
precipitation. Thus, consumptive losses and interbasin transfers greatly
limit the total number of uses to which the water can be applied and
constrict the benefits that can be derived from multiple use of the resource.
This does not mean all consumptive uses or transfers should be
barred. When they are economically and socially necessary and do not
otherwise adversely impact upon other needs for the water, consumptive
uses or transfers may be justified. Nevertheless, the problems they pose
mandate that they be given special attention.
The status of consumptive ground-water use in Pennsylvania has not
been adjudicated in any major decision. Under the riparian law applicable
to surface streams, "extraordinary" consumptive uses, such as power
plant withdrawals, may not substantially or unreasonably impair the flow
of a watercourse. 27 8 The analog in the ground water field, if a similar rule
were adopted, would proscribe consumptive withdrawals that materially
lower the water table.
With regard to preventing interbasin transfers, the policy of favoring
uses overlying the aquifer may appear to be based on the possibility of
return percolation to the aquifer of origin, which would diminish the
impact of withdrawals upon the local ground-water resources. Geologi-
cally, however, it is extremely difficult to predict that recharge on
overlying lands will actually reach the aquifer of origin. Many withdrawals
come from deep aquifers, while recharge from surface uses such as
agricultural irrigation are often intercepted by upper saturated zones,
perched water tables, or impervious strata and diverted to different
aquifers. 279 Thus, to some extent virtually all ground-water extractions,
whether applied to consumptive or non-consumptive uses, materially
affect water table levels in at least a limited area.
The goal in controlling consumptive losses is to assure maximum
availability and efficient re-use of water, not to foreclose all processes
involving evaporation, transpiration, or transfer losses. Moreover, the
questionable credibility of the ordinary-extraordinary dichotomy even in
the riparian cases280 raises significant doubt whether the existing common-
law approach will have continuing validity. A rational conservation policy,
278. Weston & Gray, supra note 9, at 365-72.
279. CORKER, supra note 245, at 119; see S. DAVIS & R. DEWEIST, supra note 246, at
43-48.
280. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (riparian
owner has cause of action caused by "natural and ordinary" use of another's land only if
defendant was negligent or malicious), overruled, Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co.,
455 Pa. 392, 411, 319 A.2d 871, 881 (1974). As applied to riparian water allocation, the
ordinary/extraordinary distinction arising from the "natural flow" rule creates a non
sequitur. Ordinary (domestic) uses are allowed to take the entire quantity of water flowing in a
stream; extraordinary (manufacturing) uses may not materially diminish the quantity and
quality reaching lower riparian owners. See Palmer Water Co. v. Lehighton Water Co., 280
Pa. 492, 124 A. 747 (1924); Scranton Gas & Water Co. v. Delaware L & W R.R.. 240 Pa. 604,
88 A. 24 (1913); Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140 (1872); Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106
(1871); North Mountain Water Supply Co. v. Troxell, 14 Luz. 161 (Pa. C.P. 1908), aff'd, 223
Pa. 315, 72 A. 621 (1909); Weston & Gray, supra note 9.
rather than a flat consumptive use prohibition, is required to assure
adequate water for all beneficial nonconsumptive and necessary consump-
tive water needs.
F. Is Economic Efficiency Encouraged?
Two primary concerns in designing a scheme of water law to deal with
an increasing scarcity of water are (1) the ability of the system to provide
life-sustaining water to all the people, and (2) the degree to which the
system maximizes efficient use and production.
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The economic efficiency factor has two separate aspects, both of
which may be addressed by arrangement or manipulation of water use
priorities. The first of these goals is to encourage those uses that produce
the greatest value. Second, the system should seek to encourage the most
efficient, least wasteful use possible. If these factors are considered in the
delineation of priorities, the system will inevitably move toward greater
economic efficiency.
A water law system will encourage economic efficiency and benefi-
cial development if it allows the broadest range of uses. In a theoretical
market economy, water would be allocated and water rights traded among
uses until the total profit gained by all users and the value of water, as
applied in each use, are maximized. 282 More would be paid for uses in
which a unit of water produces a high net value than for uses in which the
same amount of water produces less net value. An allocation system's
ability to support new, efficient development depends upon the responsive-
ness of the management scheme to the cost of the resource. If there is no
"market" in which water rights can be exchanged and valued, or if the
''market price" does not accurately reflect the cost or value of the water,
the resulting resource allocation and mix of activities using the water may
be less than optimal.
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The market model provides only a theoretical backdrop for under-
standing the economic efficiency goal. Several practical factors interfere
with reliance on a market scheme to reach an economically efficient use of
water. First, because of an apparent overabundance of water, competition
among prospective water users, and hence a water rights market, has been
281. For a general discussion of economic considerations in water law and policy, see T.
BERGIN, VIRGINIA WATER LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (prepared for the Va. State Water
Control Bd., 1976); J. HIRSHLEIFER, J.C. DEHAVEN & J.W. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY,
ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY (1960) [hereinafter cited as HIRSHLEIFER]; I WATERS
& WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, §§ 60-63; Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic
Criterion for a System of Water Rights, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN
UNITED STATES 531-32 (Haber & Bergen eds. 1958).
282. See T. BERGIN, supra note 281, at 41-51, for a cogent description of a theoretical
market in water rights.
283. See id. at 54-74; C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS:
TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES (National Water Comm'n Legal Study
No. 4, 1971); R. DAVIS & S. HANKE, PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN WATER RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT (National Water Comm'n Study No. 12, 1971).
slow to develop. Furthermore, projects to develop water, such as large
reservoirs, are primarily financed by federal and state tax dollars. Until the
recent adoption of water charges by the Delaware River Basin Commis-
sion, 284 most users were not required to internalize water costs. Second,
some of the competing uses of water, such as support of fish and wildlife,
recreation, and aesthetic enjoyment, are public or common goods.28 5 They
are hard to value because no one in particular bids for their use, nor is there
a practical way to charge those who enjoy the benefits.286 Third, water
rights are difficult to transfer, particularly if the place of use will change.
The effect of a use at one point in a stream or aquifer may be quite different
from that of a withdrawal elsewhere. The change may affect so many
parties that the transaction may become impossible to arrange.
287
Thus, while economic efficiency should be a goal of water law, this
does not necessarily imply a market economy in water. It means that the
water management scheme should encourage uses of water that produce
the highest economic and social benefits.288 Economic efficiency must be a
factor in both public and private decision making.
In addition to economic difficulties in seeking optimal allocation
of resources, legal impediments to efficient water use are created by
present ground-water law. The most important of these is the prohibition of
using ground-water on land other than that from which it is extracted.
There is no reason to believe that the most economical location for all water
use is a lot with a well. Topographic conditions, transportation facilities,
zoning or other factors may indicate that water could be better utilized if
pumped to another location allowing more intensive development. Con-
sider, for example, an industry owning two lots one mile apart. One
overlies a high water yield limestone formation but has sloping terrain
unsuitable for a factory location. Another overlies low water yield strata
but is flat and abuts a rail facility. Economic efficiency might best be
obtained by transporting water from the first lot to a factory located on the
second. Unfortunately, the off-land use prohibition of Pennsylvania com-
mon law would bar such an efficient solution.
Pennsylvania law also tends to encourage uneconomic ground-water
use by failing fully to assess the cost of water use decisions. Suppose
landowners A and B have wells for their domestic uses and landowner C
284. DRBC, Resolutions 71-4 and 74-6 (adopted May 22, 1974), in DELAWARE RIVER
BASIN COMM'N, WATER MANAGEMENT OF THE DELAWARE BASIN A-6 to A-9 (1975).
285. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.3-.4 (Supp.
1976).
286. T. BERGIN, supra note 281, at 62-66; see J. DUE & A. FREEDLANDER, GOVERN-
MENT FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 38-40 (5th ed. 1973). See also Davis &
Whinston, On the Distinction between Public and Private Goods, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 360
(1967).
287. T. BERGIN, supra note 281, at 68-74; cf. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW
& ECON. I, 15-19 (1960); Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1968).
288. CORKER, supra note 245, at 128-30, 135-42; E. CLYDE & D. JENSEN, supra note 245,
at 71-73.
decides to install a new well in the same aquifer. Together the well users
lower the water table. Under the American rule of non-liability as applied
in the Commonwealth, each owner pays individually to drill a deeper well
to maintain water use. As extraction increases, the cost of deepening wells
and producing water increases until an equilibrium point is reached at
which the marginal cost of production equals the gain (marginal utility)
from production. Increased production is clearly inefficient. Under current
ground-water law, however, each new well driller who enters the basin
does not pay the total increased cost, which now exceeds the value
produced, but pays only the cost of having to drill a few feet deeper. Other
injured well owners must deepen their wells at their own expense. As a
result, more wells are installed and water is continually extracted beyond
economic efficiency. This failure of the American rule to internalize all
costs of ground-water use seriously inhibits its ability to employ market
mechanisms and private decision-making to achieve economic
efficiency. 289
It should be recognized that some policy considerations, as for
example "distributional fairness," 290 may operate contrary to a promotion
of economic efficiency in water use. The theoretical prevention of valuable
mining activities that might dewater shallow domestic wells, in order to
provide "distributional fairness" to home owners, may result in an
inefficient use of water. Similarly, an automatic priority given to irrigation
over industrial activities, regardless of the relative value of the crop or
commodity produced, is unlikely to optimize use of scarce resources.
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G. Does the System Provide Sufficient Security of Water Rights to
Protect Beneficial Investments?
"Security" in the water law field has come to have several different
meanings. Three major aspects of water rights security can be discerned.
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The first is "legal certainty," the ability to predict the operation of the law
in a given factual setting. The second is "physical certainty," protection
against variations in the available quantity of water attributable to seasonal
or annual changes in runoff or ground water recharge. The third is
"security of water tenure," protection from reductions in water availabil-
ity as the result of lawful acts of others, be they individuals or groups,
private or public.
All three kinds of security, or potential uncertainty, may have
important economic implications in either encouraging or hindering bene-
ficial investment. Decisions to invest in enterprises that require water-
289. Morse, Well Pumping and a Declining Water Table-An Economic Analysis, in C.
MEYERS & A. TARLOCK, supra note 254, at 592-93; see Friedman, The Economics of the
Common Pool: Property Rights in Inexhaustible Resources, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 855 (1971).
290. See notes 307-09 and accompanying text infra.
291. E. CLYDE& D. JENSEN, supra note 245, at 81-84. See generally CORKER, supra note
245, at 130-35; HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 281, ch. 4.
292. 1 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 63.2.
virtually all modern activities-will be adversely affected by insecurity in
predicting whether adequate water will be available during the life of the
projects under contemplation. Since physical shortages are likely to arise,
"legal" and "tenure" security are of particular concern.
As noted earlier, Pennsylvania ground-water law rests in large part
upon ambiguous distinctions and vague, generalized doctrines, many of
which are outdated or divorced from physical reality. Tenure security
under Pennsylvania common law extends no further than protection from
intentional or negligent actions that result in foreseeable injury to ground-
water use2 9 3 and from interferences caused by off-land uses.294 There is no
security against unannounced, drastic losses of water created by new
competing uses or sudden dewatering to allow mining. 295 The best security
under the Pennsylvania version of the American rule is achieved by the
deepest well and the biggest pump.
To the extent the legal system is interested in protecting beneficial
investments, the need for security does not dictate that every water use
receive a preference. Clearly, if one use is given greater security, others
must have less. There can be little argument that domestic and municipal
uses deserve special consideration as far as tenure security is concerned,296
but giving such uses the highest preference and security in time of shortage
inevitably means other users, such as industries and power plants, will
have less certainty that adequate water will be available for their needs.
Investors may be given a measure of security by assurance that losses
due to displacement by subsequent "higher preference" uses are at least
compensable. Through use of eminent domain provisions or liability for
damages, the law may require that compensation be given to investors
whose water use is impaired by later, higher priority, uses. 297 This would
not only assure security, but would internalize the opportunity costs of
displaced uses into the decision whether certain new water uses should be
given a preference in a water-short area. Indeed, this may be one of the
most important elements of a legal system designed to provide both the
security and the flexibility needed to assure economically efficient water
use.
H. Does the System Allow Flexibility to Meet Changing Water Needs?
Flexibility in water rights is a factor countervailing the need for
security, but equally important. It focuses upon "those aspects of water
293. See notes 89-101 and accompanying text supra.
294. See notes 102-10 and accompanying text supra.
295. See, e.g., DiGiacinto v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 27 Leh. 307 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
296. I WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 63.2. Since domestic use is by definition
the application of water to sustain human life it is difficult to argue that any other use could
have a higher priority.
297. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 639(1967) (public water supply agencies holding
allocation permit may use eminent domain to appropriate certain water rights); WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.03.040 (1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3 (1959); NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'N ON
rights which facilitate or obstruct changes over time in the allocation of
water resources between regions, uses, and users. "298 There are several
such aspects to be considered.
First is the transferability of water rights. If water rights cannot be
transferred, the uses of water may be frozen in time. Newer uses that
produce greater social and economic value will be impossible to establish
unless a water surplus exists. If a higher valued use cannot "buy out" the
water rights of a less valuable enterprise, no economically efficient
resource allocation can be achieved.
Pennsylvania common law allows limited voluntary transfer of ground-
water rights. When land is sold the right to extract ground water passes
with it to the new owner, who may apply the water to a new use. 299 Water
may not be sold for application at another location, however, if the
withdrawal will affect other aquifer users. 3  It is possibile that an off-land
user could purchase "releases" from all owners whose ground-water
rights are potentially affected, thus foreclosing lawsuits to enjoin the
off-land water withdrawal.3° But the large number of transfers that would
be required and the cost that would be incurred may render negotiated
purchase of water rights releases prohibitive.
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Involuntary transfers of ground-water rights may occur through
prescription, 30 3 public water supply appropriations compensated through
eminent domain, 30 4 or damage actions. 305 Vague definitions of water rights
may make it difficult, however, to determine when the prescriptive period
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL WATER USE ACT § 410 (1958) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
WATER USE ACT].
298. 1 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 63.4, at 425.
299. See Lybe's Appeal, 106 Pa. 626 (1884).
300. E.g., Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 41 A.2d 87 (1940).
301. See Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON. &
SOCIOLOGY 131, 138 (1969) (discussing riparian rights releases).
302. Id.
303. 1 WATERS& WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 63.4; NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra
note 13, at 40-41, 43-45. See notes 102-10 and accompanying text supra.
304. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 13225(4), F (Supp. 1976) (public utility corporations
holding permits from the Water and Power Resources Board [now Department of Environ-
mental Resources] may condemn surface and subsurface water rights); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5199.11 (Supp. 1976) (second class county may condemn surface and ground water
resources); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 12907 (Supp. 1976) (county water authorities may
condemn drilling rights, subsurface rights, water and water rights); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§
2905-06 (1974) (city or borough may appropriate springs and streams for public water supply);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 3071X, 3080 (1974) (water supply district may appropriate or
condemn property and springs, streams, and rivers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 38505 (1957)
(city may condemn springs, streams, rivers or creeks); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 47411 (1966)
(borough condemnation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 56901 (1957) (first class townships may
condemn property for waterworks). It should be noted that some of the eminent domain
authorizing statutes condition the condemnation power upon receipt of a permit from the
Department of Environmental Resources pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 591-625,
631-41 (1967 and Supp. 1976). These permit acts, however, only apply to surface waters. Read
together it is unclear whether these laws limit condemnation powers of some public utilities or
municipalities to surface waters, and exclude ground waters. But see cases cited note 305
infra.
305. See Hatfield Twp. v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 403 Pa. 113, 168 A.2d 333 (1961);
Davison v. Shenandoah Borough, 38 Pa. County Ct. 697 (C.P. Schuyl. 1911).
has been triggered by violation of ground-water rights, or whether ground-
water rights have been taken by a public authority.
A second facet of flexibility is the latitude allowed new beneficial
water uses in relation to prior uses. In this regard, present Pennsylvania
water doctrines are quite flexible. New uses are treated equally with prior
applications of ground water so long as all are located on the land from
which the water is extracted. There are no established preferences of water
uses, although vague references to "ordinary and natural" ground-water
uses306 may eventually be interpreted so as to create such priorities.
Thus, current Pennsylvania rules are flexible, but they fail to pro-
vide adequate security. The only major inflexibility is created by the bar
against use of water on non-overlying land. In the final analysis, this
element of inflexibility may be a serious impediment to the substantial
development of ground-water sources for many of Pennsylvania's water
needs.
L Does the System Allowfor Considerations of Distributional Fairness?
Perhaps the most misunderstood and abused consideration in water
law is that of distributional fairness. Whether posed in terms of "justice,"
"fairness," "equity," or "fair share," it is a concept founded on a
political decision of social justice between competing special interests.
30 7
Considerations of distributional fairness in any system are designed to
humanize other factors in the decision-making process. This consideration
is normally invoked to exempt a class of people from the uniformity of
treatment that is necessary for an economically functional system. It often
acts contrary to economic efficiency, supporting water uses other than
those that are economically most valuable. This is not to say that distribu-
tional fairness is necessarily a negative goal. For social and political
reasons, "fairness" and "justice" will remain important objectives, even
though they may mean favoring one or another special interest group on a
basis other than economic production.
Distributional fairness was not a significant factor in the development
of the Pennsylvania ground-water rule. Perhaps the original linkage of
ground-water rights with land ownership tended to distribute water more or
less evenly among concerned parties. In a time of increased urbanization,
however, distributional fairness and social justice might question assigning
the greatest water rights to the holder of the largest land mass while
virtually excluding the unlanded city dweller from all water rights. 30 8
Arguably, several elements of present Pennsylvania law result in
unfairness and injustice to substantial numbers of ground-water users.
306. See Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514
(1863); 1 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 54.2.
307. See generally CORKER, supra note 245, at 130-35; HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 281,
ch. 4.
308. Gaffney, supra note 301, at 139.
Unfairness stems from the features criticized above under the economic
efficiency analysis, particularly the rule of non-liability for "noninten-
tional," "nonnegligent" interference. The baldest example of unfairness
lies in the mine dewatering cases. 3°9 Why should many farm and home
owners be required without warning or compensation to give up their water
rights to a mining company? This is not a question of relative value of uses.
If mining is truly more valuable, it can afford to pay the whole cost of its
operation and provide compensation or alternative water to injured
neighbors.
J. Does the System Provide for Recharge of Aquifers and Use of
Underground Reservoirs for Artificial Storage?
It has been common practice in developing Pennsylvania water
resources to construct surface dams and reservoirs to store water for dryer
periods. For a variety of reasons, including mounting costs and adverse
social and environmental impact, major surface water storage projects are
facing increasing disfavor and even hostility among a large segment of the
public. 310 Concurrently, substantial urban development throughout
Pennsylvania is radically altering the amount of runoff from precipitation,
decreasing ground-water recharge in many water-short regions. 311 More
water is flowing to the sea in floods and high runoff, and less is remaining
available in ground-water storage.
One potential alternative method of increasing available water sup-
plies is the use of artificial recharge to replenish ground-water acquifers.
Put another way, the natural capacity of aquifiers can be used to store and
transmit water for future withdrawal and use. 312 But several significant
legal questions must be answered if this alternative is to be made viable. 313
1. Can A store water beneath B's soil without acquiring a right to do
so from B?
2. Can B or someone else extract the water that A has artificially
recharged and stored in the common aquifer?
3. To what extent is A liable if higher ground water levels that result
from artificially recharging water interfere with the land uses of
others, for example, mine dewatering by B?
If the legal scheme posits that artificial recharge "trespasses" beneath
the soils of all landowners overlying an aquifer, or if the law allows all
owners freely to extract recharged water, development of ground-water
309. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
310. CORKER, supra note 245, at 81-94.
311. See A. O'DELL, W. THURBER, & J. FRITZ, JoINr PLANNING COMM'N OF LEHIGH-
NORTHAMPTON COUNTIES: REGIONAL STORM DRAINAGE PLAN ch. 4 (1973); REGIONAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH INST., ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY OFTHE WISSAHICKON WATERSHED WITHIN THE CITY
OF PHILADELPHIA, PART 1, 43-109 (1973); Hammer, Stream Channel Enlargement Due to
Urbanization, in 8 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 1530, 1534-40 (1972); Leopold, Hydrology
for Urban Land Use Planners-A Guidebook on the Hydrologic Effects of Urban Land Use,
in U.S. GEOL. SURVEY CIRC. No. 554 (1968).
312. CORKER, supra note 245, at 81-94; P. DOMENICO, supra note 245, at 20-21;
N.W.W.A. MANUAL, supra note 245, at 1-74.
313. CORKER, supra note 245, at 183-85.
storage will be virtually precluded. Ancient doctrines of "absolute owner-
ship" to the center of the earth make little sense in the modern world.
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Artificial storage and recharge are likely to occur, unintentionally and
unavoidably, wherever irrigation takes place or wherever man's activities
cause water to be spread on permeable ground. Harmless use of otherwise
unused interstices of strata beneath another's land should not be subject to
legal liability. Nor should overlying landowners be permitted to partake
freely of another's efforts to recharge an aquifer to the detriment of the
person who developed the water.
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The treatment of artificial recharge under current Pennsylvania law
has not been settled. The only recorded case on the subject, Annville Stone
Co. v. Hershey Chocolate Corp. ,316 was settled prior to a final decision on
the merits. The limited perspective provided by the Annville Stone case,
together with earlier mine dewatering decisions, suggests that artificial
recharge may be placed in an anomalous position under Pennsylvania law.
Miners engaged in dewatering to reach valuable deposits may lower the
water table without liability, 3 17 but cannot complain if their neighbors try
to raise it. Similarly, each landowner may have the right to recharge ground
water to replace depleted storage, but such recharge may be just as lawfully
removed by others for their own use and disposal. Such a rule, if indeed
adopted, would betray an irrationality akin to the "common enemy"
drainage rule. 318 Ground-water recharge would become a neighborhood
contest between injection and removal pumps, with breach of the peace as
the probable result. Use of underground storage would be foreclosed, since
no person who incurred the expense of recharging the aquifer would have
assurance against its depletion by others.
K. Does the System Allow Pooling of Resource Rights?
The increased density of urban development creates significant
ground-water use problems. If every landowner in even a medium size
borough drilled a personal well, the inevitable result would be interfering
314. Id. at 184; Krieger & Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56,
69-74 (1962).
315. See City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289(1943); City
of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199,537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
316. 364 Pa. 199, 71 A.2d 291 (1950) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction). In
Annville, a quarry owner filed for injunctive relief to bar artificial recharge by the candy
manufacturer. Hershey had purchased water pumped from the Annville mine for use in its
operation. During drought periods in 1949-50, Hershey disposed of the water in dried ponds
formerly fed by springs on its lands. This, Annville charged, caused increased percolations to
its mine, frustrating dewatering efforts. Hershey argued it was only recharging water needed
for its own and neighboring wells injured by Annville's pumping. The Dauphin County court
denied a preliminary injunction against Hershey's recharge efforts, and the supreme court
affirmed. The basis for the denial was no showing of irreparable harm incurred by Annville.
Id.
317. See notes 87-94 and accompanying text supra.
318. See Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891
(1940); Hanks, supra note 9, at 690-91. One set of commentators aptly described the common
enemy rule as a neighborhood contest between pipes and dikes "in which might makes right,
and breach of the peace is often inevitable." Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water:
Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 72, 78 (1968).
cones of depression and inefficient recovery of water. As in the oil and gas
area, water well spacing is important in achieving optimum development
of ground-water resources. Physical necessity and economic efficiency
mandate that individuals be able to pool their ground-water rights so that
they may develop those resources as one person. Pooling allows joint
construction of fewer wells, with distribution of the water to all sharing the
resources.
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Pennsylvania common law does not allow pooling arrangements.
Water rights are strictly limited to uses on the land of extraction; use of the
water on other lots is prohibited if the removal of water interferes with any
other landowner. 320 Thus, for example, if ten neighboring owners desired
to drill one well rather than ten, they would be prohibited from doing so if
another nearby landowner's well were even slightly injured. But if they
drilled ten individual wells they could deplete the aquifer and injure others
without liability. Current Pennsylvania law thus favors close, inefficient
well spacing rather than pooling, even if the former results in greater injury
to others.
L. Are Environmental Values Protected?
Water is essential to all life. While it is important to create a legal
system that will secure necessary resources for human development, it is
also imperative that the overall environment be maintained. In many cases
these two considerations support the same goal.
To protect the natural environment, the legal system governing the
use of ground water must reflect stresses on the environment. Overuse of
ground water may lead to drainage of lakes and swamps, diminution of
stream flows, degradation of fertile soils, and subsidence of surface
strata. 321 Poor planning or operation of ground-water extraction or
recharge facilities may lead to irreversible pollution of high quality sources
through either surface contamination or interconnection of saline or
polluted aquifers with those of potable quality. 322 Care must be taken to
develop an environmentally sound ground-water management program.
With the exception of cases imposing liability for ground-water
pollution,323 Pennsylvania common law does not distinctly recognize
protection of environmental values as an element of ground-water manage-
ment. The importance of the stream base flow support provided by ground
water in maintaining aquatic and other wildlife is not considered by current
common-law doctrines. The central focus of Pennsylvania ground-water
decisions is allowing landowners to extract as much water as possible. The
319. See Gaffney, supra note 301, at 137-41.
320. See notes 102-10 and accompanying text supra.
321. CORKER, supra note 245, at 83.
322. S. DAVIS & R. DEWEIST, supra note 246, at 237-41; P. DoMENICO, supra note 245, at
79.
323. See notes 150-76 and accompanying text supra.
impact of article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania constitution, which
protects natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values as part of the public
trust, 324 has not yet been adjudicated in this field. It should be noted,
however, that to the extent that basin commission ground-water permit
programs for major withdrawals have been activated,3 25 environmental
factors have at least achieved a limited forum for consideration.
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M. Is the Legal System Administrable?
The final and perhaps most important consideration is the cost and
ease of administration under each of the legal systems. 327 One goal of the
law is to resolve disputes and provide substantial justice as quickly and
cheaply as possible. Another objective is to put all parties on notice of their
rights and duties so that conflicts may be avoided. Both relate to the
administrability of the system.
Present Pennsylvania water law relies exclusively upon judicial
resolution of all disputes and enunciation of nearly all rights. Although the
rule authorizes a landowner to use ground water for all domestic, natural
and ordinary uses on his land,3 28 the definition of what uses are "natural
and ordinary," and thus lawful, can be settled only on an ad hoc basis. Past
decisions do little to clarify rights of individuals in subsequent conflict
situations. The present common law provides practically no guidance
for private, non-litigative resolution of conflicts. When conflicts arise,
either the matter must be taken to court or the party with the deepest well
and strongest pump wins by default.
Water disputes are often long and expensive. The law cannot supply
substantial justice when it takes one to four years to settle a water dispute
during a drought. Even a relatively simple ground-water dispute could cost
each party over $5,000 through the trial stage. While the costs of drilling a
new well to replace a depleted source may be substantial (around $10 a
foot), the expense of recovering legally-entitled damages or obtaining
injunctive relief will often be even greater.
VI. Conclusion
It is a familiar expression that "you never miss the water till the well
runs dry." The expression applies to today's water laws and institutions.
324. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (Supp. 1976), states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
325. See notes 214-35 and accompanying text supra.
326. Both the Delaware and Susquehanna basin commissions require environmental
impact statements on major water resource activities which may have a significant effect
upon the environment. 18 C.F.R. § 401.52 (1976); 18 C.F.R. § 803.23(c)(2)(iii) (1976).
327. See Coase, supra note 287, at 19-29.
328. See notes 64-75, 95-103 and accompanying text supra.
The public will not miss a rational, comprehensive water law until it needs
that law to resolve conflicts in water use.
Water has always been, and will continue to be, one of our most
important common resources. The law developed to govern water, particu-
larly ground water, in Pennsylvania is at least partially based on legal myth
and historically incorrect or incomplete scientific data. In the absence of a
reasoned water policy and law, citizens are confronted by a babble of
doctrines, rules, distinctions and exceptions that turn enterprises depen-
dent on water rights into potentially unpredictable and precarious adven-
tures. As water demands continue to grow, conflicts of a type and
magnitude largely unknown during the past two centuries are inevitable.
"For hydrologic and geologic reasons based on unalterable laws of the
physical universe, rules of law which allocate water resources must
change." 32 9 Alternative approaches to resource problems must be seri-
ously explored 330 to answer the important challenge facing the Common-
wealth: how to manage its water resources in the common interest of all its
citizens.
329. CORKER, supra note 245, at 233.
330. For a detailed analysis of alternative legal systems to manage ground waters, see R.
WESTON & M. GANG, GROUND WATER LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA (Pa. State Water Plan Water
Laws & Institutional Arrangements Background Rep. No. 2. 1976).
